

CURRENT HISTORY

A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs



LATIN AMERICA

**NAFTA and After: A New Era for
the United States and Latin America?**

Peter Hakim 97

**The 1993 Plebiscite in Puerto Rico:
A First Step to Decolonization?**

Juan M. Garcia Passalacqua 103

**Haiti: A Nation in Despair,
a Policy Adrift**

—A CONVERSATION WITH ARISTIDE

Pamela Constable 108
111

Mexico: Zapatista Thunder

Lucy Conger 115

**Human Rights and
the Chiapas Rebellion**

Human Rights Watch 121

Central America's Enduring Conflicts

Richard L. Millett 124

**Church and State in
Latin America**

Hannah Stewart-Gambino 129

**Colombia: Democracy, Development,
and Drugs**

John D. Martz 134

Book Reviews

On Latin America 138

The Month in Review

Country by Country, Day by Day 141



CURRENT HISTORY

FOUNDED IN 1914

MARCH 1994

VOL. 93, NO. 581

Editor

WILLIAM W. FINAN, JR.

Associate Editor

ALICE H. G. PHILLIPS

Editorial Assistant

MELISSA J. SHERMAN

Editorial Intern

LEANNE P. MOS

Consulting Editors

VIRGINIA C. KNIGHT, MARY Y. YATES

ANDREW M. LOVATT

Contributing Editors

ROSS N. BERKES

University of Southern California

DAVID B. H. DENOON

New York University

JOHN ERICKSON

University of Edinburgh

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

Wellesley College

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

University of Virginia, Emeritus

KENNETH W. GRUNDY

Case Western Reserve University

OSCAR HANDLIN

Harvard University, Emeritus

WILLIAM JOSEPH

Wellesley College

RICHARD H. LEACH

Duke University

RAJAN MENON

Lehigh University

AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON

Boston University

NORMAN D. PALMER

University of Pennsylvania, Emeritus

JAN S. PRYBYLA

Pennsylvania State University

JOHN P. ROCHE

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Emeritus

A. L. ROWSE

All Souls College, Oxford, Emeritus

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

University of Pennsylvania

AARON SEGAL

University of Texas

VACLAV SMIL

University of Manitoba

RICHARD F. STAAR

Hoover Institution

ARTURO VALENZUELA

Georgetown University

President and Publisher

DANIEL MARK REDMOND

DANIEL G. REDMOND

Editor and Publisher, 1943-1955

DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Publisher, 1955-1988

EDITOR'S NOTE:

"Chiapas is Mexico" has become the battle cry for both the dispossessed and the politically discontented in Mexico, according to veteran Mexico observer Lucy Conger. Whether the political questioning that has followed the uprising in southern Mexico will reverberate from rhetoric to action in Mexican politics—and how the fall-out might affect the run up to the August presidential elections—are the centerpiece of Conger's article this month. An important variable in these political questions—how the government and the military have reacted to the uprising—is the focus of Americas Watch director Juan Mendez's excerpted testimony.

For Mexico this was not to be the year of Chiapas but the year of celebrating the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Inter-American Dialogue director Peter Hakim explains why, even with Chiapas, NAFTA will mark a watershed in United States relations with all of Latin America.

NAFTA may mark the beginning of a new United States relationship with the south, but Richard Millett's review of Central America shows that the old relationship—neglect—has returned as policy in that region. The same holds true for Haiti, where Pamela Constable explains why Jean-Bertrand Aristide is perhaps destined to be forever introduced as "ousted president."

One bright spot in the Caribbean, however, is Puerto Rico, where a November referendum that received little attention in the United States reaffirmed the island's commonwealth status with the United States. Juan Garcia Passalacqua argues that rather than settling the issue of status, the vote has opened a larger debate on the island's relationship with the United States that threatens to become divisive.

This month's issue also takes a look at recent events in Colombia in John Martz's contribution and Hannah Stewart-Gambino examines the changing role of the Roman Catholic Church in the region and the rise of evangelical protestantism and its sociopolitical impact.

—W.W.F.

Coming in April:**CENTRAL ASIA****NO ADVERTISING**

Current History (ISSN 0011-3530) is published monthly (except June, July, and August) by Current History, Inc., 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, PA 19127. Copyright © 1994 by Current History, Inc. Second-class postage paid at Phila., PA, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Current History, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, PA 19127. Annual subscription rate: \$31.00. Foreign \$37.25; Canada \$38.25 (GST included). Canadian GST #R132446592. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*, *The Abridged Reader's Guide*, *Book Review Index (BRI)*, *ABC POL SCI*, *PAIS*, *SSCI*, *Current Contents*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Academic Index*, *Magazine Index*, *Magazine Article Summaries*, and *America: History and Life*. Indexed on-line by DIALOG, BRS, and Information Access Magazine Index. Microfilm: University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI. Requests to photocopy should be sent directly to Current History. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts.

Printed in the United States.

CURRENT HISTORY

MARCH 1994

Vol. 93, No. 581

With NAFTA in place "the Clinton administration faces two fundamental questions: First, when and how should the United States extend free trade arrangements to the other countries of the hemisphere? And second, should the United States enhance cooperation on political as well as economic matters in the Americas—and if so, how?"

NAFTA. . .and After: A New Era for the US and Latin America?

BY PETER HAKIM

Relations in the Western Hemisphere last year were dominated by one protracted event: the rancorous, high-intensity debate in the United States over the North American Free Trade Agreement. Throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States decision on NAFTA was considered a bellwether of future policy toward the region. By establishing a free trade pact with Mexico, the United States would open the way to closer economic relations with all Latin American and Caribbean nations and an eventual hemisphere-wide free trade system. In contrast, most Latin American governments would have taken the defeat of the agreement as a sign of impending American disengagement from the region. Not even the Alliance for Progress or the Panama Canal Treaties, the two highlights of the past half-century of American diplomacy in Latin America, carried greater symbolic importance for United States relations in the hemisphere than NAFTA's approval by Congress.

Now that the agreement is in place, the policy challenges for the United States in the region are much clearer. The Clinton administration faces two fundamental questions: First, when and how should the United States extend free trade arrangements to the other countries of the hemisphere? And second, should the United States enhance cooperation on political as well as economic matters in the Americas—and if so, how?

NAFTA aside, the other important events in inter-American affairs last year were what didn't happen.

PETER HAKIM is president of the Inter-American Dialogue, an assembly of Western Hemisphere leaders, and writes a monthly column for the Christian Science Monitor.

The most dramatic of these was the failure of the United States, working with the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN, to end de facto military rule in Haiti and restore President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to office. International pressure succeeded, however, in foiling President Jorge Serrano Elias's attempt at a Fujimori-style coup in Guatemala.

Nicaragua narrowly averted political breakdown and economic collapse. Cuba's economy crumbled further, but Fidel Castro completed, without incident or challenge, his thirty-fifth year in power. Brazil's political institutions withstood, once again, the corruption of the nation's political leaders while the economy continued to teeter on the brink of hyperinflation without falling over. Venezuela survived the impeachment of a president and new elections without a military coup. And relatively uneventful presidential elections took place as scheduled in Paraguay, Bolivia, Chile, and Honduras.

WHAT CLINTON INHERITED

Following his own election last year, Bill Clinton was decidedly upbeat about future links with Latin America. He welcomed "a new convergence of values" in the Americas and called for the United States and Latin American nations to join in constructing a "Western Hemisphere Community of Democracies." Relations were in good shape—as good as at any time in recent memory, and much better than when George Bush took office four years earlier.

The major conflicts that divided the United States from Latin America in the 1980s had largely been settled. The foreign debt crisis had receded; the wars in Central America had ended; and illicit drugs were no

Elements of the North American Free Trade Agreement

- All tariffs will be lifted over the next 15 years. Textile, apparel, automobile, and auto parts tariffs will be gradually phased out; 57 percent of agricultural tariffs will be lifted at once, with the gradual easing of tariffs on United States corn and Mexican peanuts, orange juice, and sugar. Tariffs can be temporarily reinstated if exports rise dramatically.
- Foreign investors from NAFTA member countries to be treated like domestic investors except in United States airline and radio communications industries, Mexican energy and railway industries, and Canadian culture industry.
- By the year 2000 all limits on investment in Mexican banks will be lifted for United States and Canadian banks, securities brokers, and insurers.
- Truckers may freely cross the Mexican border by the end of 1999.
- Intellectual property will be protected by each country's standards.
- NAFTA member companies may compete with government bids for purchases.
- Commissions will be established to investigate labor and environmental abuses and to impose fines or trade sanctions on governments failing to observe their pertinent standards.
- The United States and Mexico will invest in a North American Development Bank that will lend money to communities severely affected by NAFTA and aid environmental cleanup projects by the US-Mexico Border Environmental Commission.
- The United States will spend \$90 million to retrain workers who are laid off because of NAFTA before July 1995.

longer a source of friction. With few exceptions the nations of the region were governed by democratically elected leaders, and they had liberalized their economies, opening them to foreign trade and investment. Moreover, the hemisphere's two most important regional institutions—the OAS and the Inter-American Development Bank—were functioning more effectively than they had in a long time, reflecting increased United States-Latin American cooperation in both.

It was not only that the old conflicts had been settled. New opportunities were also emerging for the United States in Latin America. The region had become the fastest growing market for American exports, and American investments were soaring. Just weeks before Clinton was inaugurated, the United States joined Mexico and Canada in formally signing NAFTA (although ratification by the three countries' legislatures was still pending). And virtually every Latin American government had expressed interest in forging long-term commercial partnerships with the United States.

Despite these acknowledged advantages, the Clinton administration did not engage in much hemispheric community-building in 1993. Indeed, aside from responding to crises or near-crises in Haiti, Guatemala, and a few other countries, the administration downplayed Latin America. By and large, senior policymakers stayed away from the region, and rarely mentioned it in their speeches. The most creative regional program, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which had been initiated by the Bush administration, was deemphasized.

The Clinton administration's approach to Latin America mirrored its more general difficulty in defining and organizing its foreign policy agenda. The president did not travel to the region, but neither did he visit Europe. Latin American policy, moreover, was hostage to NAFTA. Until NAFTA's fate was settled, nothing much could be done to devise a longer-term strategy toward Latin America and the Caribbean.

THE NAFTA DEBATES

The nearly yearlong battle over the North American Free Trade Agreement turned out to be far more strident and difficult than supporters had expected. Initially, Clinton and his advisers thought they could blunt opposition to the pact, which was heavily concentrated in the Democratic party, by negotiating supplementary agreements with Mexico and Canada to deal with the most controversial issues—including environmental problems and workers' rights. Once reached, however, these agreements had little impact on public opinion and failed to influence many votes in Congress.

During the six months it took to negotiate the side pacts, the opposition was able to mobilize an impressive public campaign against the accord. Critics managed to set the terms of the debate, and for most of the year administration advocates found themselves on the defensive. It required an extraordinary eleventh-hour lobbying effort with the intense involvement of both the president and vice president to get a favorable vote on NAFTA in the House of Representatives. But by

exercising visible leadership on the issue and achieving a strong come-from-behind victory, Clinton succeeded in erasing any doubts about his own commitment to the agreement. His administration's stock rose considerably in Latin America.

Critics of the trade agreement sought to focus attention on Mexico's low wages, poor working conditions, dismal environmental record, and questionable democratic practices. The debate, however, had little to do with Mexico or with Latin America; the vote was not a referendum on United States relations with the region. For most Americans the crucial question was the potential impact of NAFTA on the domestic economy, especially employment. The pact galvanized the fears and misgivings of citizens troubled by economic change and uncertainty about their own future. But NAFTA will not affect the United States much at all. The Mexican economy is just too small, less than 5 percent the size of the United States economy. Indeed, in the 15 years it will take to implement NAFTA's provisions, the United States economy will expand by the equivalent of seven to ten Mexicos.

The debates in the United States over NAFTA, which were widely reported and followed in Latin America, were often painful listening for the region. They underscored the great asymmetries of wealth and power between Latin American countries and the United States, and illustrated once again how Washington can make major decisions affecting Latin America without taking much account of the region's interests or preferences. At the same time, however, these very public debates may have increased Latin American understanding of the complexities and peculiarities of United States politics, and thereby may have helpfully reduced exaggerated expectations that NAFTA's benefits can be quickly extended to many other countries.

No matter what the debates were about in the United States, in Latin America and the Caribbean the vote on NAFTA was widely and anxiously viewed as a defining moment for the future of United States relations in the hemisphere: the United States would choose either to open its markets or to close its doors to the region. And this view was more right than wrong. The failure of the United States to reach a free trade agreement with Mexico—its nearest and most important Latin American neighbor and its third most important trading partner worldwide—would have ended, for some time at least, any prospect of closer economic and political ties with the rest of the region. The rejection of NAFTA would have jettisoned the prospective cornerstone of a more comprehensive and cooperative United States policy in Latin America.

The converse, however, is not true. Approval does not by any means assure a smooth relationship with either Mexico or Latin America as a whole. Relations with Mexico, particularly, may become more acrimonious as NAFTA is implemented. The contentious issues

raised in the debates in the United States over labor protection, environmental cleanup, illegal immigration, and electoral fraud will not go away.

To the contrary, NAFTA has sharply increased the visibility and salience of these and other issues in both the United States and Mexico. Advocacy groups from both sides of the border have become intensely engaged and are working together more closely than ever before. Greater United States involvement in Mexican political affairs seems inevitable. Most of the pressure for change will be directed toward Mexico and much of it will come from groups in the United States, governmental and nongovernmental. This asymmetry will itself be a potential source of conflict.

With presidential elections in Mexico scheduled for August, United States–Mexican relations may come under special strain this year. The central issues will be whether the Mexican government allows for reasonably free and fair elections, and what Washington decides to do to encourage clean elections and how it responds to anything less.

So far the Clinton administration has conveyed an ambiguous message. On a trip to Mexico City in December, Vice President Al Gore spoke a great deal about democracy—as much or more than any previous United States leader visiting the country had ever done—but at the same time he made no specific reference to Mexican elections or Mexican democracy. Although the opposition remains skeptical, the early statements of the official candidate of the ruling Revolutionary Institutional party (PRI), Luis Donaldo Colosio, suggest the electoral playing field may be kept more level than in the past—perhaps because Colosio appears such a sure bet to win and because of the international spotlight that NAFTA has focused on Mexico. The effects of that spotlight were evident in the Mexican government's cautious, even conciliatory approach in dealing with the New Year's Day guerrilla uprising in Chiapas state. It is still too early to assess the longer-term significance of that event, but it has shaken Mexican politics and may well create an even more open atmosphere in the conduct of the country's presidential elections.

BEYOND MEXICO

Latin American and Caribbean governments are waiting for the response to another set of questions. They want to know whether the Clinton administration plans to stop at Mexico or whether it will seek free trade relations with other countries of the region—and if so, under what conditions and at what pace.

Administration officials are aware of the historic importance NAFTA has for the future of inter-American relations, and they appear to want to press forward with hemisphere-wide policy initiatives. Immediately following congressional approval of the trade pact, Clinton assembled the leaders of seven Central Ameri-

can countries—a sequel to an earlier meeting with five Caribbean prime ministers. During his visit to Mexico, the vice president announced a United States proposal for a summit meeting later this year of the hemisphere's democratically elected heads of state, the first hemispheric summit since 1967. And once NAFTA was ratified, the president and his advisers began again to call for the forging of a Western Hemisphere Community of Democracies. To be sure, these are all still symbolic gestures. Latin Americans will now be looking for concrete actions that confirm the Clinton administration's commitment to regional economic and political cooperation.

Washington has pledged next to develop a free trade arrangement with Chile. No timetable has been set, however, and it has not been decided whether Chile will be invited to join an expanding NAFTA or whether the United States will choose to negotiate a bilateral trade deal with the country. Extending the North American Free Trade agreement would be the better start for a longer-term strategy of regional economic integration. It would transform NAFTA into the core of a hemispheric trade club, to which countries would seek admission when they were ready. This would avert a criss-crossing, haphazard pattern of free trade deals, each with differing rules and procedures.

Four other countries—Argentina, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Colombia—have been identified as possible candidates for a free trade arrangement with the United States. None yet rivals Chile or Mexico as an attractive partner for the United States, however. Moreover, unlike Chile and pre-NAFTA Mexico, all already participate in subregional free trade pacts with other countries. Could Argentina, for example, continue to meet its obligations to Brazil and other partners in the Southern Cone Common Market and at the same time join a free trade area with the United States? A similar question applies to Costa Rica in the Central American Common Market, and Venezuela and Colombia in the Andean Pact.

The nations of the Caribbean and Central America are worried, with good reason, that NAFTA will cause an erosion of the benefits they now receive through the United States-sponsored Caribbean Basin Initiative. In response to their appeals, Clinton has pledged to protect them against any damage from the North American agreement, but the administration has not yet proposed a specific formula. The most promising approach seems to be the temporary extension of NAFTA trade preferences to the Caribbean countries involved, pending their eventual accession to NAFTA.

Washington's enthusiasm for pursuing regional free trade arrangements will depend to a large extent on the performance of both the United States and Latin American economies in the coming period. A significant downturn in the United States economy or a worsening of unemployment is likely to provoke

additional protectionist pressures and to constrain new foreign policy initiatives. Similarly, sluggish growth in Latin America will tend to dampen United States interest in closer economic ties. The more vibrant the economies of the region are, the greater their appeal as free trade partners will be for the United States.

Brazil is key. Only in Brazil—which has 40 percent of Latin America's population and produces 40 percent of its economic output—are United States economic interests potentially as engaged as they are in Mexico. If the Brazilian economy stabilizes and regains its vigor, it would quickly become a booming market for United States products and capital investments, and begin to create a powerful constituency in the United States for regional free trade arrangements. If Brazil remains crisis-ridden, Latin America overall will be a far less attractive economic partner. The United States may still decide to proceed toward free trade with Chile and a few other Latin American countries—but with Brazil on the sidelines, there is unlikely to be a strong push from Washington for a hemispheric free trade system.

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Through NAFTA, Latin America provided Clinton with his most important foreign policy triumph in 1993. In Haiti he confronted one of his most visible setbacks. Along with Bosnia and Somalia, Haiti became a symbol of the administration's failures and frustrations in international affairs.

Intent on breaking the stalemate that had characterized the Haiti situation for the previous 15 months, President-elect Clinton pledged intensified United States efforts, in collaboration with the OAS and the UN, to restore exiled President Aristide to office. Success appeared close last July when Haiti's military commander, General Raoul Cédras, and Aristide met on New York's Governors Island and signed an accord calling for an interim civilian government headed by an Aristide-appointed prime minister; the resignation of Cédras and other key military and police officials; the stationing in Haiti of a foreign military force under UN auspices that would reorganize and retrain the army and police; and Aristide's return by October 31.

The Haitian military subsequently scuttled the Governors Island accord, refusing to fulfill its obligations and stepping up its repression of Aristide supporters. It is unclear whether more decisive action by the United States could have dramatically changed this outcome, but there was no doubt that Washington's policy was marked by ambivalence, or that disagreements among government agencies hampered action.

Now, at the beginning of 1994, United States policy toward Haiti has again struck an impasse. No one expresses much optimism that the current approach, which includes a worldwide oil and arms embargo, can achieve its goal of forcing the military to step aside and allow Aristide to reassume power. Meanwhile, the

already impoverished population of Haiti is paying most of the cost of the failed policy, suffering military oppression, the economic hardships caused by the embargo, and the United States ban on most Haitian refugees (when caught in international waters, these refugees are automatically sent back to Haiti).

Sooner or later Clinton will have to confront the unpleasant choice between taking the necessary steps (possibly including the use of military force) to impose a solution on the Haitian army, and retreating from his commitment to Aristide and seeking accommodation with the army. Neither is likely to command much political support, domestically or internationally, but no other alternatives have emerged, and the current situation probably cannot be sustained for much longer.

Other United States efforts to help protect democratic rule in the hemisphere have enjoyed greater success. Guatemala was a particular triumph. The United States joined the OAS and nearly every other hemispheric nation in responding quickly and forcefully to stop President Serrano from assuming dictatorial powers in a coup modeled after that of President Alberto Fujimori in Peru a year earlier. This international response helped to catalyze and then reinforced the internal opposition to Serrano's attempted takeover, forcing his resignation and contributing to the restoration of constitutional rule (which is, nonetheless, still very precarious).

The Clinton administration can also take some credit for the improvements in Peru's human rights performance last year. The Peruvian government has responded, albeit grudgingly, to United States conditions on economic support. And the administration may have helped avert another coup attempt in Venezuela by sending two senior officials to warn the Venezuelan armed forces and business community of United States concern about any such action.

Its initiatives in Haiti, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela were solid affirmations of the administration's commitment to democratic practice and human rights. However, the administration has not yet articulated a strategy for assisting Latin American countries to strengthen their still feeble democratic institutions or for responding to the persistent violations of human rights that characterize so many countries of the region. Nor has the administration demonstrated much interest so far in building regional capacities for collectively promoting and defending democracy and human rights.

In recent years the OAS has taken an increasingly active part in hemispheric affairs and has shown a growing potential for contributing to the advancement of democracy. Yet the organization remains constrained on the one hand by internal operational weaknesses and limited resources, and on the other by differing national views about its appropriate role in promoting democratic politics. United States leader-

ship could help overcome these constraints, but the Clinton administration first has to decide the kind of regional organization it would like to see take shape, and the level of authority and independence it should have.

Among the specific measures the administration could take to fortify the OAS, the most important is to press hard for the election of a strong new secretary general in next year's vote, which it has recently begun to do by promoting Colombian President César Gaviria for the post. The United States might also encourage the expansion of the mandate and resources of the OAS's Unit for Democracy and its Commission, Court, and Institute for Human Rights; the rethinking and perhaps outright abolition of the Inter-American Defense Board, a military-run operation associated with the OAS; and more active OAS involvement in anticipatory diplomacy, including efforts to tackle the sensitive problem of civil-military relations in Latin America. It is particularly crucial that the Clinton administration—if it wants to strengthen collective action to protect democracy—resist any temptations to intervene unilaterally in the region.

THE DRUG WAR AND CUBA, AMONG OTHER PROBLEMS

Despite a yearlong review, the administration has not yet clarified its antinarcotics strategy in Latin America. Confusion remains over priorities, objectives, and means—and different agencies of the United States government appear to be pursuing conflicting policy approaches. In principle, the administration seems to have accepted the overwhelming evidence that United States antidrug efforts abroad have no impact on domestic drug abuse, and that overseas eradication and interdiction cannot stem the flow of drugs into the United States or even increase their street price.

Yet although the amounts are decreasing, Washington continues to finance an overseas campaign against illicit drugs and to involve United States military and police agencies in the battle. And in its bilateral relations with some countries the United States continues to emphasize antidrug efforts. With money for aid as scarce as it is, there is no argument for continuing the drug war in Latin America, except if it is reformulated as an effort to help supplier countries deal with their drug problems—that is, to combat drug corruption, control the violence of drug criminals, and bolster core democratic institutions like the judiciary.

United States policy toward Cuba is an unhappy remnant of the cold war, and one that continues to divide the United States from nearly all Latin American and Caribbean nations. The Clinton administration has in the past year taken steps to end the overt hostility between the United States and Cuba. Most significantly, Washington has eliminated the belliger-

ent tone and aggressive rhetoric formerly common in official communications with and about Cuba. This has been publicly recognized by the Cuban authorities. The United States has also opened the way for improved telephone and mail links with the island, increased flows of humanitarian aid, and limited cooperation on drugs and migration.

But the administration has stopped short of any basic change in the 30-year-old United States policy of squeezing Cuba economically and isolating it politically. Like preceding administrations, it appears unwilling to change course so long as Fidel Castro retains power. For the time being, Clinton and his advisers have rejected a more activist approach that might include some combination of reducing punitive sanctions against Cuba, expanding the flow of people and information between the two countries, beginning a process of negotiation with Cuban authorities, and seeking to cooperate with other governments to encourage peaceful change in Cuba.

The Clinton administration is just not ready to risk alienating the Cuban-American community, with its sizable bloc of votes in Florida and numerous congressional allies, by undertaking to reshape and liberalize policy on Cuba. Regardless of its anachronistic, cold war flavor and its inconsistency with United States approaches to promoting democracy elsewhere, that policy now seems likely to change only if support for such change emerges among Cuban-Americans. And it may yet, if Cuba's economy continues to deteriorate, the suffering of ordinary people increases further, and the danger of violent conflict on the island grows.

LOOKING AHEAD, AND SOUTHWARD

For the past several years, while NAFTA was being negotiated, debated, and ratified, the United States had good reason to defer the development of a broader policy approach toward Latin America. As long as policy remained undefined toward Mexico, the Latin American country of overwhelmingly greatest importance to the United States, it was hard to develop an approach to the rest of the region. Now that NAFTA has been approved and has entered into force, the challenge for the Clinton administration is to decide what kind of relationship it wants with Latin America and the Caribbean and how much it is prepared to invest in trying to build it.

With new presidents scheduled to take office this year in most Latin American countries—including Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, and four of five Central American nations—important transformations could surely take place in the region. Yet it is hard to recall a time when the United States has had a

more favorable opportunity to shape, with its own policy choices, the future of hemispheric relations. The United States clearly has differences and disagreements over many issues with many Latin American governments, but has no serious clashes or impending confrontations with any of them.

More than that, virtually every country in the region has expressed interest in forging closer economic ties with the United States, and most—with the important exception of Brazil—appear ready to move quickly toward some form of free trade arrangement with the United States. Latin American governments are more skeptical about political cooperation, and many would be wary, for example, of a more assertive stance by Washington in promoting democracy and human rights. Yet regional governments are now more willing than ever before to accept and even follow United States leadership in situations like Haiti and Guatemala—provided that the United States refrains from the unilateral use of military force.

Most Latin American governments want the United States to take more initiative in inter-American affairs. And since NAFTA was approved, administration officials are acting like they want to assume greater leadership, as signaled by the vice president's call for a regional summit, repeated statements about forging additional free trade pacts, and frequent reiteration of the idea of hemispheric community. The administration must choose whether to proceed cautiously—on a bilateral, case-by-case basis—or to move more boldly and imaginatively toward a genuinely multilateral, “community-building” approach.

On the economic front, should the United States negotiate free trade agreements one by one with a succession of individual countries, or begin now, in tandem with its NAFTA partners, to consult with other Latin American and Caribbean governments about the future of hemisphere-wide trade arrangements? Such consultations would focus on establishing criteria, procedures, and timetables for extending NAFTA, and developing a new regional mechanism to guide and coordinate progress toward a hemispheric free trade system.

In the political realm, the question is whether the administration should continue simply to respond to individual crises as they arise, or undertake a sustained initiative to transform the OAS into a far more effective instrument for safeguarding democracy and human rights. The challenge will be mobilizing the support of Latin American and Caribbean governments for this change. But perhaps more than in any other region, the Clinton administration has an agenda of opportunity in the Western Hemisphere. ■

"After 95 years of selective inattention and benign neglect on the issue of colonialism, it is time for the White House and the Congress of the United States to face the music, bite the bullet, and decolonize the island and the people of Puerto Rico."

The 1993 Plebiscite in Puerto Rico: A First Step to Decolonization?

BY JUAN M. GARCIA PASSALACQUA

On November 14, 1993, for the first time in Puerto Rico's history, islanders were able to freely express their preference for the political future of the "self-governing commonwealth" whose people have American citizenship but not all the rights and responsibilities that usually go with it. Some 1.7 million eligible voters—a record 80 percent of the electorate—chose, in a nonbinding plebiscite, from among the traditional three options for Puerto Rico: independence; statehood, as the fifty-first state; and "commonwealth."

"Commonwealth" won, but the result was hardly a victory for the status quo. The movement supporting statehood for Puerto Rico, which had been gaining strength for decades and had forced the vote on the issue, saw the statehood tide reversed. Independence was soundly rejected as an option. And since leaders of the pro-commonwealth faction spent the three months leading up to the balloting calling the commonwealth a colonialist remnant, they are now expected to push in Washington for an "enhancement" and "clarification" of Puerto Rico's status that would take the island out from under the absolute power of Congress via a negotiated "bilateral compact" between a sovereign Puerto Rico and the United States. Thus colonialism in Puerto Rico would come to a definitive end.

Puerto Rico's standing has been an issue since Spain ceded the island and nearby islets to the United States

after the Spanish-American War, but this part of the story begins with George Bush's election as president.¹ In his first State of the Union address, in January 1989, Bush asked the United States Congress to consider granting statehood to Puerto Rico, since pro-statehood candidates for the governorship of the island had been winning ever larger percentages of the vote for 37 years. In response to this initiative, pro-commonwealth Governor Rafael Hernández Colón invited the leaders of the statehood and independence movements to join him in requesting Congress to pass legislation approving a binding plebiscite on the three options, which they did in a letter dated January 17, 1989.

Congress considered a "Puerto Rican Self-Determination Act" for more than two years. The House of Representatives unanimously approved a nonbinding plebiscite, but the Senate Natural Resources Committee failed, by a 10–10 vote, to approve self-executing legislation that would automatically lead to Puerto Rico's statehood if the island's people voted for it in a plebiscite. Anti-statehood Republican senators prevailed in demanding that the people of the island express their will in a vote before considering any option in Congress.

After winning the governorship of Puerto Rico in an unprecedented landslide in 1992, Pedro Rosselló of the pro-statehood New Progressive party placed a measure before the island's Legislative Assembly that set the plebiscite for November 14, 1993. The bill was approved last summer as an exercise of the First Amendment right to petition the Congress for the redress of grievances since Congress had failed to approve the referendum that President Bush had called for. All three local political parties—the New Progressive party, the pro-commonwealth Popular Democratic party, and the Puerto Rican Independence party—agreed to participate. In the campaign, which began after the Fourth of July, Governor Rosselló promised to abide by the decision of the majority; his ads proclaimed, "You will speak, I will obey."

President Bill Clinton, at a Congressional Hispanic

JUAN M. GARCIA PASSALACQUA is a political analyst for radio, television, and newspapers in San Juan and Miami. He is a professor of politics and history at the Centro de Estudios Avanzados de Puerto Rico y el Caribe in San Juan, and a visiting professor at Yale. His publications in English include *Puerto Rico: Equality and Freedom at Issue* (New York: Praeger, 1984).

¹See Juan Manuel Garcia Passalacqua and Carlos Rivera Lugo, *Puerto Rico y los Estados Unidos: El proceso de consulta y negociación de 1989 y 1990* (Río Piedras: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, Tomo I [1990], Tomo II [1991]).

Caucus function and in a CNN interview, supported the plebiscite and self-determination for Puerto Rico, calling the prospect "exciting" and promised to accept "anything they may decide," and he did so again speaking to the Hispanic Cadena Telemundo television network. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) advised Clinton that the administration would face "a diplomatic imbroglio" should the Senate refuse to honor a result favoring statehood for Puerto Rico; Moynihan also reportedly told the president there was no way the Senate would vote for statehood.

The House Subcommittee on Insular and International Affairs held hearings July 13 on a resolution filed by Representative José Serrano (D-N.Y.) in support of self-determination. During the proceedings, broadcast live on Puerto Rican radio, Serrano insisted that Congress would be obliged to respond to the plebiscite. At later hearings before the House Western Hemisphere subcommittee, chairman Robert Torricelli (D-N.J.) said that if a majority of Puerto Ricans voting did not agree on the island's status, "we will have to make the judgment for them" because Puerto Rico's present status was economically and politically untenable for both Puerto Rico and the United States.

A CNN/Time poll conducted in the United States the week of November 4 showed 21 percent of respondents favored statehood, 24 percent favored independence, and 32 percent were for the status quo. The Puerto Rican community in the United States, 2.6 million strong, demanded that it be allowed to participate in the plebiscite, but was rebuffed by the island's pro-statehood government. In an official vote conducted October 15 in New York City in which 30,000 Puerto Ricans cast ballots, the commonwealth option won handily.

DEFINING THE OPTIONS

The August 8 *New York Times* correctly saw the plebiscite in Puerto Rico as an issue touching the "identity" of the island's people, who are fiercely proud of their 500-year history as a Caribbean nationality, with a majority concerned about assimilation. The first salvos on the island were fired over what the three formulas for the political future meant. No definitions—only the bare-bones choices "statehood," "commonwealth," and "independence"—were included on the plebiscite ballot, but each of the parties presented an extensive elucidation of the option it supported in a brochure distributed at all polling places.

The pro-statehood camp had no apparent problem defining its position as one "preserving Puerto Rican culture" (while not insisting on a separate cultural identity) and gaining for Puerto Rico the rights of a state. Campaign ads at first emphasized "guaranteed" statehood, assured of a favorable vote in Congress. But this soon changed to a "negotiated" one, with empha-

sis on a \$6.5-billion annual increase in the amount of federal aid for the poor. (The island currently receives \$8.5 billion a year from Washington.)

For the pro-commonwealth Popular Democratic party, a believer in the *Estado Libre Asociado* (Free Associated State) status for Puerto Rico, the definition of its formula for the future posed a quandary. Doreen Hemlock, writing in the June 14 *San Juan Star*, called it "commonwealth's midlife crisis." Would the party defend Puerto Rico's present status as a United States territory, or demand for the island a "bilateral compact" outside the United States Constitution's "territorial clause" (since the United States cannot enter into a compact with a territory, only with a sovereign people)? The latter option had been rejected by Rafael Hernández Colón, who steered the Popular Democrats for 20 years before his resignation in 1992, in testimony before Congress in 1989, but was espoused in the plebiscite campaign by Senator Marco Rigau.

The debate was fueled by a decision by the United States Circuit Court in Atlanta holding that Puerto Rico was a territory under the absolute power of Congress. Some Popular Democrats defended outright colonialism. But the leadership opted for a commonwealth "encompassed," as it declared in the brochure for voters, "in a bilateral compact" between Puerto Rico and the United States "that cannot be altered except by mutual agreement"—a commonwealth outside the territorial clause, and one that would have sovereignty. The party's campaign before the plebiscite, however, was centered around the costs of statehood and the destruction of the economy the party said statehood would cause. It began by emphasizing "The Union That Works" with the United States, but soon abandoned this slogan (under pressure from the "bilateral pact" wing) in favor of "The Best of Two Worlds."

The pro-independence sector also had its troubles, splitting down the middle on the question of whether to participate in the vote or not. Its extreme left dissolved the pro-Cuban Socialist grouping and became the *Nuevo Movimiento Independentista*, which advocated abstention from the balloting and retained the right to wage an armed struggle. Others insisted that the 19 Puerto Rican political prisoners in United States jails must be released before a valid vote on status could be held. On the other hand, the Independence party called for polling and adopted a definition that incorporated a ten-year transition period of United States friendship and aid—what the press termed a "solvent" independence.

ISSUES AND JEERS

For the first month of the campaign, the "bilateral pact" definition of commonwealth adopted by the pro-commonwealth camp was assailed by statehooders as leading toward a *República Asociada*. (The term "república" raises fears in Puerto Ricans, based on

years of colonial indoctrination and persecution of supporters of a republic on the island.) Local Secretary of State and Status Commissioner Baltasar Corrada del Río let it be known that if statehood did not win the United States would indeed grant a form of "free association" as promoted by Senator Rigau. But pro-statehood strategists had miscalculated; the issue failed to ignite passions, most notably the fear of an Associated Republic that it had so effectively unleashed in the 1991 referendum on identity led by the Popular Democrats' Rafael Hernández Colón and the Independence party. Two years before the issue had given the pro-statehood proponents a huge victory, by a margin of 100,000 votes, but this time around it died quietly in mid-campaign.

For some weeks beginning in May, islanders were preoccupied with the Clinton administration's plan to limit tax credits for multinational corporations with operations in Puerto Rico, which simultaneously soured feeling about the United States and made Puerto Ricans consider more closely the financial consequences of statehood. (Under section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code, which applies to United States territorial possessions, Puerto Rico is a tax haven for such multinationals.) This in turn brought up the fact that Puerto Rico would lose the benefits of the section if it became a state (because of the Constitution's "uniformity clause"). The Popular Democratic party included continuation of Puerto Rico's status as a tax haven for multinationals in its proposed compact with the United States. The pro-statehood government in San Juan scrambled to defend benefits under the section, disgusting many traditional statehood adherents. Statehooders, then and later, charged that by raising the issue, the Clinton administration helped drive backers of statehood to vote for "commonwealth."

Another issue that surfaced early was culture, including language, and representation at the Olympics and, incredibly enough, the Miss Universe beauty pageant. "Could a state have an Olympic team?" proponents of statehood were led to wonder. Angered by the prospect of Puerto Rico's Olympic team being subsumed in the American contingent, thousands of fans booed the United States basketball team at a match against Puerto Rico in San Juan in November. Language became an issue when pro-commonwealth campaign manager Celeste Benítez put on the air an ad in which Representative Toby Roth (R-Wisc.), the leader of the "English only" movement in the United States, argued that statehood meant English would become the first and the only official language for the island. Congress, Governor Rosselló responded, would not reject keeping Spanish under statehood. The issue of culture became crucial in the campaign leading up to the vote, expressing an obvious undercurrent of nationalism.

All camps used United States political figures for their own purposes. The Independence party cited

Senator J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.), who contended Puerto Rican independence was economically viable. The New Progressive party tried to capitalize on endorsements of statehood by former Presidents Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush. Bush traveled to Puerto Rico during the last week of the campaign but surprised his local allies by not joining them on the trail, merely issuing a lukewarm endorsement for statehood. Senator Daniel Akaka (D-Hawaii) and Representative Don Young (R-Alaska) were brought to the island by a pro-statehood group to allay fears that statehood would mean cultural obliteration. The Popular Democratic party relied heavily on Representative Gerald B. Solomon (R-N.Y.), who told Puerto Ricans that statehood was being misrepresented to them by its advocates.

Advertising, particularly television spots, played a major role in the campaign. Pro-statehood ads used Governor Rosselló as the option's only spokesman, the governor claiming that if Puerto Rico became the fifty-first state taxes would be lower, the poor would receive increased benefits, and youths would not have to leave the island to seek opportunities. Pro-commonwealth advertising focused on maintaining the Spanish language and the island's culture and sports teams, and on the jobs created and sustained by tax breaks. Ads for independence showed youths who seemed well informed talking to their parents about taking charge of the island's destiny and preserving Puerto Rico's culture while maintaining friendly relations with the United States.

THE PLEBISCITE OF FEAR

In early October, statehood was ahead in all the polls. However, a poll published in the October 21 *San Juan Star* showed commonwealth in the lead with 38 percent, statehood at 33 percent, and independence with 5 percent support; 24 percent of respondents were undecided. In the final few weeks of the runup to the plebiscite, the Popular Democratic campaign produced a shift of 3.5 percent from the statehood to the undecided camp.

Fear, whether of the establishment of a republic (whipped up by statehooders) or the imposition of federal taxes (fanned by the commonwealthers), was the real main issue. In the end, the new fear of taxes was stronger than the historical fear of a republic.

Some 10 days before the vote, statehooders took a new tack. Senator Paul Simon (D-Ill.), an ardent proponent of statehood, made public a Library of Congress report stating that American citizenship can be revoked by Congress so long as Puerto Rico continues to have commonwealth status. The Popular Democratic party and even rabid statehooders called this "deceitful," but the juridical reality is such.

The last week of the campaign was characterized by an unprecedented silence among voters. This time

around, Puerto Ricans, who traditionally turned out by the hundreds of thousands for political rallies, stayed home and people were informed mainly by television.

The final debate between the three party leaders, held November 10, was an immensely boring affair (though the format the campaign managers chose was later blamed for the tedium). The pro-commonwealth spokesman, Miguel Hernández Agosto, the minority leader in the local Senate, invoked *la patria* (the fatherland) more than 20 times, attempting to stir up pro-independence voters and mobilize nationalist sentiment among younger voters. Governor Rosselló, speaking for the statehooders, used three of his turns to respond to people's fear of losing homesteads given away by previous governments because of property taxes under statehood. (At least 100,000 such homesteads had been awarded, and the governor later blamed this issue for his option's defeat.) The Independence leader, abandoning the party's former left-wing rhetoric, called on middle-class voters to reject "dependence" on federal welfare funds. Senator Hernández Agosto carried the evening with his emotional finish (in response to Rosselló's request for a mandate to "negotiate statehood"), declaring: "*La patria no se negocia. La patria no se vende. ¡La patria se defiende!*" ("The fatherland is not negotiable or for sale. It must be defended!")

The Popular Democratic party closed out the campaign on the upswing, appropriating all the symbols of *la patria*. The Independence party called for a reaffirmation of faith in political sovereignty and rejection of what it saw as dependence and cultural annexation. The New Progressive party harped on the fact that Congress could unilaterally revoke United States citizenship for Puerto Rico's residents.

Two polls were issued in the last days of the campaign. The one appearing in the November 10 *El Nuevo Día* declared the race a dead heat, with commonwealth's late lead reduced to 1 percent, and with a tendency among the undecided to opt for statehood. Sergio Bendixen of Los Angeles-based Asesores Incorporated, a widely respected pollster and political analyst, made public a crucial poll November 11–12 on the Telemundo television network that showed, among respondents planning to vote, commonwealth with 48 percent support, statehood with 47 percent, and independence with 5 percent. The polls showed that the retention of tax benefits for foreign corporations that provide jobs on the island, the avoidance of federal taxes, and continued Olympic representation for Puerto Rico were the main issues for pro-commonwealth voters. Most important for pro-statehood voters were an increase in welfare benefits, the right to vote for president of the United States, and guaranteed American citizenship.

When the day came, and after a record number of

November 1993 Plebiscite Results

Choice	Vote	Percentage
Commonwealth	823,258	48.4
Statehood	785,859	46.2
Independence	75,253	4.4
Total Voters	1,701,392	

About 1 percent of ballots were deliberately spoiled in protest.

Puerto Ricans went silently to the polls and voted, the status quo was the result.

THE DEEPER MEANING OF THE VOTE

The plebiscite was the first electoral opportunity Puerto Rican voters had to freely express a preference in the vital matter of the island's political future. (A referendum held in 1967—which affirmed the present commonwealth status—was tainted by blatant interference by United States intelligence agencies documented and denounced as "hanky-panky" in a White House memorandum issued during the Carter administration.) The pro-statehood movement, whose candidates had been gaining larger and larger proportions of the vote in Puerto Rican gubernatorial elections between 1956 (12 percent of ballots cast) and 1992 (49.3 percent), and which was expected to reach 50 percent support in the November plebiscite, suffered a painful, and probably final, reverse. Sixty thousand who had backed statehood in 1992 switched their preference. In addition, a move toward independence was soundly rejected by voters in the plebiscite.

The United States Senate, in spite of the presidential mandate, had insisted that any initiative on change in Puerto Rico come from the island. That initiative has now been taken. All three choices on the plebiscite ballot as defined by the local parties promoting them were conceived of as political conditions outside the territorial clause; Puerto Rico's status, it was agreed, had to change. The American citizens residing in Puerto Rico have filed a petition for the redress of the grievance of colonialism, and opened their bid to get out from under the territorial clause of the Constitution of the United States. Bowing to the popular will expressed in the plebiscite, elected pro-independence politicians, along with the governor, will join in the effort to "clarify," "develop," and "enhance," as the commonwealthers say, the "bilateral compact" between Puerto Rico and the United States if legislation is introduced in Congress.

The remaining question is, how will Congress respond?

The hearings on the status issue before the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee in the House of Representatives October 5 served to clarify one crucial point, quickly lost in the din. Chairman Torricelli indicated unequivocally that if at least 50 percent of the people of Puerto Rico did not agree on an alternative on November 14, or if Congress was unable to grant what they petitioned for—because the votes for statehood were not there—“we will make the judgment for them.” Thus the plebiscite results must inevitably initiate a process of political change on the island, and may lead to a confrontation between the leadership in Puerto Rico and the United States Congress.

Having delegitimized the present commonwealth, failed to give the statehood movement even a plurality, and made the votes of those who support independence pivotal, the plebiscite will unleash a protracted period of serious political and economic instability unless Congress responds quickly with a counteroffer on Puerto Rico's status. This offer must clarify and enhance the compact between Puerto Rico and the United States, and afford the Puerto Rican people sovereignty. The victory of the anti-annexation forces could encourage economic stabilization and sound long-range investment and planning on the island, if the petition of the majority gains a receptive review in Congress for the “bilateral compact” vision of commonwealth status. All indications are that Puerto Rico's petition will receive prompt attention.

Prompt congressional attention is required because if the situation is left to fester it will have enormously detrimental effects on the business climate in Puerto Rico, which could spill over into the whole Caribbean Basin. Experts attending the Conference on Territorial Policy at George Washington University in February 1993 counseled Congress to afford a Puerto Rican petition the same “fast track” approval procedure used for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) so as to reduce uncertainty as much as possible, and to reserve the right to make an immediate counteroffer to the electorate in Puerto Rico.

The Clinton administration now must decide whether to keep the president's pledge to support in Congress whatever the Puerto Rican people decided, or whether to receive the results and do nothing. Lobbying by the president is deemed essential. In its absence, the role of the three Puerto Rican-born members of Congress is vital.

This window of opportunity must be taken advantage of. The plebiscite was a truly free expression of the people's will, since it was held after the cold war, when all its deleterious effects on the past half-century in the

hemisphere and the world, had come to a close. The vote will not end the status debate in Puerto Rico or about Puerto Rico, but it has put the island on a course away from annexation to the United States.

The plebiscite puts policymakers in both Puerto Rico and the 50 states (as well as European and Latin American powers) in a position to join in the design of a future for the island. The people of Puerto Rico can play a protagonist's role in the Caribbean within NAFTA and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, among others, as soon as the island is afforded the powers and international standing that it would gain with a sovereign Free Associated State status and a bilateral compact with the United States on defense and security.

The new status will usher in an era of civil peace on the island and in the United States, free of the state and clandestine violence that has marred the relationship since the Nationalist uprisings of the 1930s, and with amnesty for all Puerto Rican political prisoners now in United States jails. In the past, militant clandestine pro-independence groups like the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) and Los Macheteros have opted for violence in defense of Puerto Rican sovereignty; that would no longer be the case. Even though the new status is definitely not full independence, the grant of sovereignty outside the territorial clause will permit those favoring that option to defend it peacefully and freely, by electoral means.

Finally, the adoption of the bilateral compact will permit the United Nations to review the resolution its Decolonization Committee approved in 1978, in which it added “free association” as a legitimate alternative available for the decolonization of the people of Puerto Rico. American citizenship for Puerto Ricans would continue to be a strong tie with the United States, together with common security and defense, but Puerto Rico would obtain international standing and membership in the UN.

As demanded by the Juventud Autonomista Puertorriqueña, a Puerto Rican youth group that defended the “sovereign bilateral compact” idea in a full-page ad in the *Washington Post* November 19, 1993 (Puerto Rico's quinquennial), and for all the preceding reasons, this process must lead to the disposition of the territory by Congress and the creation of a sovereign Free Associated State of Puerto Rico. After 95 years of selective inattention and benign neglect on the issue of colonialism, it is time for the White House and the Congress of the United States to face the music, bite the bullet, and decolonize the island and the people of Puerto Rico. ■

"Haiti's hopes for rescue from years of poverty and oppression, briefly buoyed by the election of a charismatic hero, have probably been dashed for the foreseeable future by a combination of vicious politics in a deeply polarized nation, international misunderstanding and miscalculation of Haitian realities, reluctance by foreign democracies to intervene in a third world controversy, and conflicting policy agendas and ideological views among American officials."

Haiti: A Nation in Despair, a Policy Adrift

BY PAMELA CONSTABLE

On October 11, 1993, the American amphibious troop ship *Harlan County* approached the principal dock at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, carrying 218 American and Canadian military engineers. It was the first contingent in an international mission of up to 1,300 troops that was expected to help retrain the Haitian army and police force, engage in civic action projects, and provide a psychological deterrent to political violence when Haiti's exiled president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, returned to office in two weeks under an agreement negotiated between Aristide and Haiti's military leaders.

Instead the ship was greeted by a violent, angry mob of several hundred protesters who commandeered the dock with the collusion of port officials, brandished sticks and pistols, shouted anti-American slogans, and kicked a limousine carrying American diplomats that beat a hasty withdrawal to the United States embassy. Within 24 hours the White House ordered the ship to leave Haitian waters and repair to the United States naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Elated, Haiti's right-wing extremists noisily celebrated their "victory" over the forces of foreign intervention, even naming a new political party after the incident.

Although President Bill Clinton tried to explain the *Harlan County*'s withdrawal as a simple, temporary decision to place United States noncombat troops out of harm's way, the ship's departure was instantly perceived in Haiti and abroad as a humiliating retreat. The incident came to symbolize the turning point in Haiti's hopes for the restoration of democracy: an

unintended but unmistakable sign of international disengagement from the Haitian crisis after nearly two years of intermittent efforts to reverse the army coup of September 1991 and restore President Aristide to power.

The boldness and ease with which a handful of thugs thwarted a long-planned, UN-mandated military mission was stark proof of the ruthlessness and indifference to foreign pressure among Haiti's right-wing sectors, the high degree of foreign miscalculation and prejudice about political realities in Haiti, and the deep ambivalence among United States officials about risking harm or criticism to prop up an impoverished third world democracy. All these factors have conspired to prevent Aristide's return, and they now appear likely to leave the country in the repressive grip of the military and its rightist civilian allies.

THE PROMISE OF RESTORATION

For several months last year there was real hope that the army would relinquish power and allow the restoration of Aristide. The charismatic Salesian priest and hero to Haiti's 6 million poor had won the presidency by a landslide in the country's first fully free elections in December 1990, but had been overthrown only seven months after taking office. For nearly two years after the coup, international diplomats had worked to broker a political peace while prodding the army to relinquish power. Finally last July 3, under intense pressure from the White House and UN officials, Aristide and Haiti's army commander, Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras, signed a formal accord at Governors Island in New York.

Under the pact, Cédras agreed to step down and permit Aristide to resume power by October 30 in exchange for amnesty for those who had participated in the coup. The transition was to be aided by a new cabinet, appointed by Aristide and accepted by his opponents in parliament; by an international military training mission that would assist in separating the

PAMELA CONSTABLE, deputy Washington bureau chief for the Boston Globe, has covered Latin America and the Caribbean since 1983. She has reported from Haiti frequently during the past decade, and has traveled there numerous times since the 1991 military coup. She is a 1993 winner of the Maria Moors Cabot Prize from Columbia Journalism School for coverage of Latin American affairs. She is coauthor with Arturo Valenzuela of *A Nation of Enemies: Chile under Pinochet* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991).

police from the army and in professionalizing both forces; and by large amounts of foreign aid and technical assistance to help strengthen public institutions and rebuild the country's economy, which had been devastated by months of punishing economic sanctions.

Despite such promising steps, it soon became clear that Haiti's military leaders and their civilian allies never intended to relinquish power, that they had few qualms about offending international sensibilities or risking foreign wrath, and that Cédras had signed the Governors Island accord chiefly to obtain the suspension of UN sanctions. Although the pact called for reinstating the sanctions if serious human rights abuses occurred, the military continued to repress political dissent, condoning and orchestrating violent attacks by armed civilian enforcers, known in Haiti as "attachés," against Aristide's supporters and aides.

Throughout two years of military control, Haitians who displayed any sign of support for Aristide, or who were identified with the grassroots groups that formed his "Lavalas" political movement, were subjected to arbitrary arrest, beatings, and torture. In poor districts and villages, young men were systematically harassed and intimidated by soldiers and police, and many fled to the capital with harrowing tales of abuse by local authorities. As the deadline for Aristide's scheduled return neared, the attacks grew bolder and the victims far more visible.

On September 8, armed civilians attacked a crowd outside the Port-au-Prince city hall where Aristide's appointed mayor was attempting to take office; five people were killed. Three days later Antoine Izmerly, a wealthy food importer and major financial backer of Aristide, was dragged out of a church Mass in honor of repression victims and shot and stabbed to death in the street by a squad of gunmen as police trucks circled the area. And on October 14, Haitian Justice Minister Guy Malary—young, trained in the United States, and identified with aggressive reform of Haiti's corrupt judicial system—was assassinated in broad daylight as he drove from his Port-au-Prince office.

Malary's audacious slaying came just hours after President Clinton, concerned by reports of threats against Haitian civilian officials, warned that it would be a "grave error" for anyone to underestimate Washington's commitment to Prime Minister Robert Malval and other members of Aristide's cabinet, who had officially taken office in September and were trying to prepare for a democratic transition. Although Malary's attackers were not identified, the killing was widely interpreted as a direct military and right-wing civilian challenge to the international community and its demands.

In response, foreign governments quickly increased pressure on the army. The UN Security Council voted to reimpose sanctions on oil and weapons and to autho-

rize member states to enforce them more strictly by deploying warships off Haiti. The Clinton administration announced it was freezing the visas and United States-based assets of 41 military officers, police officials, and civilians who backed the coup, as well as blocking all United States transactions with a number of banks, business enterprises, and public ministries controlled by the military and its allies.

This time, however, the sanctions seemed to have little impact. There was widespread evidence that the military was easily obtaining oil and gasoline across the border with the Dominican Republic, and army officials appeared confident that they could survive the sanctions far longer than international opinion would tolerate a crippling embargo on a nation of desperately poor people. Instead of hinting at concessions, Cédras and other officials struck a defiant public pose, complaining that Aristide had failed to live up to the accord and issuing a series of constantly changing demands in return for their cooperation.

THE GHOST OF DUVALIER

Not surprisingly, the October 30 deadline for Aristide's scheduled return came and went with the exiled president remaining in Washington, effectively prevented from setting foot in his country. Since then, the army has coolly ignored all domestic and international requests to reopen negotiations with Aristide, while continuing to repress all pro-Aristide activity, preventing his cabinet ministers from occupying their posts, and allowing right-wing political groups to re-emerge and operate freely.

Many of these groups were associated with the former Duvalier regime, a paternalistic family dictatorship that controlled Haiti from 1957 to 1986, using a private army of enforcers known as the "Tontons Macoute" to repress dissent and keep order. After President Jean-Claude Duvalier fled Haiti in 1986 amid violent mass protests, his aides and henchmen faded into the shadows and many key figures went into exile in the neighboring Dominican Republic. During Aristide's tenure, Duvalierists were widely purged from civil service jobs, which deepened their hostility and desire for revenge. After the coup, former Duvalier aides began filtering back into Haiti, and by last fall they felt sufficiently emboldened to make a public political comeback.

In recent months the groups have held numerous public rallies, repeatedly denounced Aristide and Malval, demanded the withdrawal of American and UN officials from Haiti, and threatened to take violent action if Aristide attempts to return. The most aggressive group, the Revolutionary Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (whose acronym, FRAPH, means "to beat" in French), has been widely linked to armed violence against Aristide followers. In late December, FRAPH members raided Port-au-Prince's larg-

est slum, Cité Soleil (Sun City), an Aristide stronghold, where they burned hundreds of shacks to the ground and forced local bus drivers to change their signs to "Simone City," the area's original name—which referred to the name of Duvalier's mother.

MYOPIA AS POLICY...

To an astonishing degree, American officials underestimated the cynicism, greed, ruthlessness, and deep hostility to Aristide among military leaders and their civilian confederates, who also include conservative businessmen and criminal gangs. These sectors, as well as the ousted Duvalierist clique, had made little secret of their intense dislike for Aristide before and during his brief tenure in power, viewing him as a rabble-rouser and ideologue who sought to rule through mob actions and rob the tiny elite of its power and privilege.

Yet literally up until the *Harlan County* incident, United States military officials were praising Cédra as a professional officer and State Department aides were confidently predicting the army would comply with the accords. Long after the UN deadline for Aristide's return had passed, United States diplomats said they hoped to work with a younger generation of leaders within the Haitian military who had not been involved in the coup, and of finding avenues for compromise with Cédra by persuading Aristide to "broaden" his cabinet or form a coalition government that included rightists.

One reason for such misplaced confidence was a failure to accept how little Haiti's privileged classes cared about international opinion, and how much they were willing to sacrifice—including many millions of dollars in desperately needed foreign aid—in order to keep their grip on an oppressed populace whose vengeance they feared. American diplomats spoke hopefully of finding Haiti's political "center"—an illusion as long as a small, armed minority was willing to kill to preserve its power. Haiti's politicians and military officers spoke articulately, with elaborate legalism and pomp, about building institutions and respecting the law and following the dictates of the 1987 constitution. But underneath the facade they were shrewd survivors who had prospered in a system based on personal loyalties, opportunism and terror—and they were not about to lose control again.

Another blind spot may have resulted from the long-standing ties between American military and intelligence agencies and a number of top Haitian officers, including some involved in the coup, which were revealed by the press in November. According to

those accounts, several Haitian officers were kept on the Central Intelligence Agency payroll as informants up until the coup itself, and a special antidrug unit in the army, set up by United States authorities in the mid-1980s, was actually used to investigate and intimidate political opponents. In addition, some Haitian officers were allowed to continue training in the United States after the coup, further undermining the public White House message of condemnation against Aristide's overthrow.¹

Yet a variety of experts in Haiti and abroad described the Haitian security forces as little more than an association of criminal gangs and an avenue for institutionalized corruption. While Cédra was not identified with corruption before the coup, it was widely reported that he had profited since then along with two other top-ranking officers, Brigadier General Philippe Biamby and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Michel Francois. Francois, the national police chief, reportedly controlled a number of corruption rackets and was a central figure in organizing and arming the attachés.

Some Haitian experts also believe the army built up a significant business as a clandestine transshipment point for South American cocaine after the coup, especially through military control of the ports and airports in the capital. There were reports of Colombian drug interests operating in Haiti and of late-night airdrops coordinated on military radios. The civilian government's antidrug officials estimated that about 10,000 pounds of cocaine have moved through Haiti each month since the coup, but United States officials have given far lower estimates of 2,000 to 3,300 pounds a month and said the UN blockade has hampered shipments.

For the military establishment and its civilian allies, the prospect of Aristide's return threatened a highly profitable lifestyle and a level of absolute political control unparalleled since the heyday of the Duvalier regime. In addition, the security forces were terrified that his return would unleash a wave of mob vengeance in retaliation for months of repression. Since the Duvalier family's flight from power, fiery "necklacings" and crowd attacks had occurred periodically, usually aimed at individuals or symbols associated with abuse and corruption. In speeches and sermons, Aristide had appeared to condone street violence as a means of obtaining popular justice from a profoundly unjust system.

Under the Governors Island accord, Aristide reluctantly agreed to a political amnesty for the officers involved in the coup, but military officials also demanded amnesty for all crimes committed afterward, presumably including the widespread beating and torture of Aristide supporters in detention, the killing of hundreds and possibly several thousand demonstrators in the aftermath of the coup, and the assassinations of Izmerly and Malary. After two years in absolute,

¹The *New York Times*, November 1, 1993, and *The Washington Post*, October 24, 1993. It was also reported that the CIA attempted to intervene covertly in Haiti's 1987 and 1988 elections, which Aristide denounced as a military-dominated sham.

A CONVERSATION WITH ARISTIDE

Pepper Haiti's exiled president with skeptical questions, pointed criticism, or recitations of charges against him, and Jean-Bertrand Aristide's response is almost always the same: a serene, almost beatific smile, and an elliptical, metaphoric comment that can befuddle the most seasoned interviewer.

Recently Aristide was asked, during a lengthy luncheon discussion in his apartment, about the barrage of accusations from critics that he is stubborn, mentally unstable, and content to remain in righteous, comfortable exile while his country languishes in poverty and repression.

"I am at peace with my consciousness," the slender, scholarly man slowly answered. "When you hear the voice of the nation, the huge majority saying you are right, you feel natural. As a psychologist, I know that when people attack you, they use lies. . . but I know these things are not true. I am at peace."

And when asked whether he regretted anything about his seven-month tenure in office, during which he was accused of encouraging mob violence, alienating the army, and scorning his opponents in parliament, Aristide replied with an image that compared Haiti's young democracy to a perilous race.

"When I took office, we were in a car going 100 miles an hour. When the coup came, it was like an accident, after which the car had to slow down and be cautious, because it could not turn into a plane and fly away. It's not that we were moving too fast before, but that reality has changed."

Aristide's tendency toward vague, metaphoric, and mystical pronouncements has long been both a political asset and liability for him, mesmerizing and inspiring his followers among Haiti's deeply impoverished masses, yet often perplexing and frustrating his foreign interlocutors.

The most dramatic case of this double-edged rhetoric was a speech Aristide gave to a crowd in Port-au-Prince in September 1991, delivered in lyrical Haitian Creole. The address has been quoted repeatedly as evidence that he condoned the violent practice of "Pere Lebrun," or mob lynchings via flaming tires, which have been periodically carried out by frenzied crowds against soldiers, former members of the secret police, or other perceived agents of injustice.

In the speech, Aristide urged his followers to give their enemy "what he deserves," and made numerous references to Pere Lebrun as "a beautiful instrument" with a "good smell" and a "nice firm bed" that the populace could use when justice was denied. "Your tool is in your hands! Your instrument is in your hands!" he said, hinting that matches and gasoline were available when the constitution proved unable to combat official abuse.

Last October, while the United States Senate was debating whether the Clinton administration should take aggressive measures—possibly including military intervention—to restore Aristide, conservatives quoted extensively from that speech, labeling him a populist dictator

and ideological extremist who promoted mob violence.

Aristide's aides defended him against these charges, saying the speech was misunderstood, taken out of context, and delivered just after he had learned of a coup plot. But when pressed by journalists or American officials about his position on violence, the exiled leader has tended to repeat general phrases such as "we seek reconciliation, not vengeance," and to call for love and brotherhood among all Haitians.

Often, it seems as if Haiti's spiritual leader—a former Salesian priest and a shy, soft-voiced man of 40—would rather remain an enigma than stoop to the level of grubby politics even when his own fate is at stake. At times his own aides have winced at his pronouncements or quickly tried to explain them, knowing they would come back to haunt him.

Yet even after over two years out of office, Aristide clearly believes he possesses two fundamental, long-term advantages over his adversaries. One is the purifying force of good in a Manichaean struggle against Haiti's tradition of evil and corruption—hence the slogan "Lavalas," or floodtide, of his political movement. The other is the strength of his "communion" with Haiti's adoring, struggling masses—thus the symbol of the crowing rooster, lowly but feisty, in his political campaign.

To pragmatic officials at the State Department or the UN, who are desperate to find a way out of Haiti's political crisis, prevent the country from falling into economic chaos and preclude the possibility of another mass refugee flow, Aristide's righteousness may seem irrelevant and counterproductive, a sign of stubborn "pig-headedness" and failure to adapt to reality.

To Aristide's adversaries, his absolutism and evocation of dire divisions between Haiti's haves and have-nots have played neatly into propaganda warnings of apocalyptic class warfare and mob vengeance, should he be allowed to return and govern as before.

But in Haiti, where most people cannot read or write, where the power of religion and rumor are greater than the influence of facts or information, where flowery allusions to legal and constitutional order often mask crude attempts at absolute domination, where most politicians are either corrupted or killed, and where perception is 90 percent of truth, Aristide's poetic purity may well be the only meaningful form of leadership.

"It is strange but true. When I see character assassination, I don't pay attention," Aristide said with a shrug and a gentle smile when pressed at the recent luncheon to respond to his critics. Asked if he thought it was enough to be right while his country continued to suffer, he smiled again. "It is better to be right when others are wrong."

Pamela Constable ■

repressive power, the Haitian military had too much blood on its hands to allow its principal adversary, and the revered leader of Haiti's oppressed masses, to return.

... AND AMBIVALENCE AS GUIDE

In addition to underestimating the determination of Haiti's right-wing forces to remain in control, many American officials were deeply ambivalent about Washington's stated commitment to restoring Aristide to power. The conflicting messages had been flowing from various United States agencies and officials virtually since Aristide's election. The United States had pressed hard for free elections in Haiti, and worked closely with Haitian authorities to build democratic institutions after the demise of the Duvalier regime. But United States officials were alarmed by Aristide's victory, a radical slum priest who had long preached against American imperialism. During his seven months in power, Aristide had improved his relations with United States diplomats and made some efforts to reach out to the private sector, but Washington remained wary of his populist tendencies, refusals to compromise, and capacity to stir mass uprising.

From the early days after the coup, conservative and isolationist voices suggested there was no reason for the United States or other democratic powers to become embroiled in Haiti. A hopelessly backward nation of chronically poor, illiterate people, with weak public institutions and a political history of cruel despotism, Haiti had no strategic value and produced no valuable exports. Its chief focus for United States officials was not one of foreign policy, but of immigration: the potential for thousands of desperate, illiterate refugees to pour into the Caribbean in hopes of reaching Florida.

But the Bush administration, which viewed Haiti as an important test case for preserving democracy in the region, initially took the lead in efforts to restore Aristide. Washington spearheaded an embargo against the post-coup regime by the Organization of American States, which had taken an unprecedented formal stance in 1990 in favor of defending democracies. Regional diplomats worked for months to broker a diplomatic settlement under the OAS auspices, but the negotiations eventually collapsed amid mutual charges of bad faith among Aristide, the army, and rightist legislators.

The tough message from Washington, however, was gradually diluted by a number of contradictory actions, especially the administration's decision to exempt United States export manufacturers from the embargo and its harsh response to a wave of Haitian refugees who began fleeing northward in flimsy boats. At first, the Coast Guard picked up the "boat people" at sea and interviewed them to determine if they were fleeing persecution, eventually setting up a detention facility at

Guantánamo Bay to process the refugee overflow. But as the tide swelled to tens of thousands, the administration ordered all boat people returned directly to Haiti. Despite widespread evidence of repression, United States officials continued to argue that the vast majority were economic migrants—thus bolstering the Haitian regime's claims to legitimacy and undermining Washington's own argument that it was a repressive "pariah."

By the time Clinton took office in early 1993, diplomatic efforts to resolve Haiti's political crisis were at a dead end while the embargo continued to ravage an already precarious economy. The new president, who had vowed to promote democracy abroad as a mainstay of his foreign policy, redoubled efforts to restore Aristide. To the dismay of many Haitians, Clinton reluctantly adopted the Bush policy of forcibly repatriating refugees—a policy he had harshly criticized as a candidate—for fear a new mass exodus would erupt. But he publicly embraced Aristide and sought added international help from UN officials, who had until then left the Haitian crisis in the hands of regional diplomats. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali named a highly visible emissary to Haiti, former Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo, who worked closely with United States officials to press for a negotiated solution. Under their combined efforts, bolstered by the imposition of UN economic sanctions in June, the Governors Island accord was finally signed.

Once the pact began to collapse, however, it quickly became clear there was no stomach abroad for more aggressive measures to enforce it. Since the coup, both Washington and other regional governments had resisted calls for the use of military force in Haiti, hoping a combination of diplomacy and economic pressure would prove sufficient to avoid a controversial, protracted intervention. By last fall, with ethnic and regional conflicts erupting elsewhere, the issue was further complicated by broader controversy in Washington over the proper role of American forces in multilateral peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

Following a botched military raid in Somalia on October 3 that left 18 American troops dead and dozens wounded, Congress, the Pentagon, and the public grew even more nervous about sending troops into Haiti with the UN training mission, even though its intent was peaceful and the troops were instructed to avoid any confrontation. Experts argued that there was a world of difference between intervening in Somalia, where anarchy and civil war reigned, and Haiti, where an army of 7,000 was holding hostage an elected, United States-backed government. But Haitian right-wing groups, ever attuned to United States opinion, warned pointedly that they would turn Haiti into "another Somalia."

As a result, when Clinton attempted to turn up the

heat on Haiti after the Malarly assassination, his message was immediately undercut by both military officials and congressional opponents. The president ordered an extra 650 marines, along with troop transports and 20 helicopters, to Guantánamo Naval Base. He also ordered 6 United States warships to surround Haiti and enforce the reimposed UN embargo, an important visual symbol of American military might, while his aides asserted that the United States commitment to Haiti's transition was "unshakable" and that the government had "not ruled out anything" in terms of a United States response.

But these actions were challenged by conservative lawmakers, led by the Senate minority leader, Bob Dole of Kansas, who attempted to impose new limits on the president's powers to order the military abroad. Key Senate leaders grumbled that they had not been fully briefed on the purpose and scope of the UN mission, and even Democratic supporters like Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont warned Clinton against "stumbling into something we cannot control, cannot change." Amid mounting pressure on Capitol Hill, Clinton and his Democratic allies beat back efforts to limit his military powers, but the Senate approved a symbolic resolution urging him to seek their approval before sending troops into Haiti.

Pentagon officials, fearful of sending lightly armed troops into a violent third world country, resisted joining the UN mission to Haiti and peppered the State Department with last-minute concerns about safety, rules of engagement in case of attack, and Haitian military cooperation. Reassured that everything would go according to plan, they were taken aback by the violent rebuff of the *Harlan County*, which made it clear that the UN troops were not welcome and would receive little cooperation from the Haitian military. The Pentagon quickly suspended its role in the mission, thus effectively ending it. One United States military official was quoted as saying, "I don't want one American kid stubbing his toe restoring democracy in Haiti."

This double retreat, taken to avoid the risk of American casualties for unclear strategic objectives, handed Haiti's army and its civilian allies a major psychological victory, bolstering their confidence that they need not fear foreign military intervention and rendering hollow Clinton's repeated threats to take sterner action if the military continued to defy international will.

The United States action also further soured relations between United States diplomats and UN officials who had been working together on Haiti—a problem that Haiti's astute rightist leaders worked to exacerbate. While United States officials had downplayed criticism of the army, Caputo, the UN special envoy, was outspoken in his condemnation of human rights abuses and military recalcitrance. American officials, in

return, complained privately that the UN bureaucracy was too slow and cumbersome, and that Caputo's confrontational approach was counterproductive.

Western diplomats were reportedly appalled at the decision to remove the *Harlan County*, which came at a time of heightened concern about the safety of all foreign officials and visitors. As part of the effort to restore order and peace, the UN and OAS had sent about 300 human rights monitors into the country during 1993, and the surge of political attacks made them especially vulnerable targets. In early November, fearful the young volunteers might be attacked or killed by right-wing groups, the UN ordered all monitors to leave the country, and most were spirited out on late-night flights to the Dominican Republic. This move intensified the impression of international abandonment, and removed one of the few dampers on military and rightist abuse of Aristide supporters and grassroots groups.

Both American and UN officials, moreover, were reluctant to broaden the embargo beyond oil and weapons for fear of causing further humanitarian suffering in Haiti. Although Aristide himself called for the sanctions to be broadened after the Governors Island accord collapsed, only France supported his proposal. Fears of the embargo's side effects—especially its potential for creating a new mass exodus of refugees—were heightened by a Harvard University medical report suggesting that the sanctions were leading to severe malnutrition and death among Haitian children, although the researchers later said their findings were overdramatized by the press.

ARISTIDE THE "PSYCHOPATH"?

In Washington, debate over how and whether to help Haiti was further muddled by newly raised questions about Aristide's personality and politics. A charismatic figure to his followers at home, the slight, soft-voiced, 40-year-old priest had long bewildered and antagonized United States officials with his mystical elusiveness, stubborn political stances and revolutionary vision for his country. In 1991 some officials in the State Department and the CIA had circulated a "psychological profile" suggesting that Aristide was emotionally unstable and tended to promote mob violence. They had also made unusual efforts to confirm allegations that during the coup Aristide had ordered the murder of a former Duvalierist henchman who was in prison for attempting to stage his own coup in January 1991.

At the height of the domestic uproar over whether the United States should take more aggressive action to restore Aristide's government, these charges were revived in CIA briefings on Capitol Hill and circulated aggressively by conservative Republicans such as Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina. During an emotional Senate debate on October 20, Helms branded

Aristide a "psychopath" and a grave human rights abuser. Other lawmakers quoted excerpts from an infamous speech he had given in Haiti shortly before the coup, urging his followers to give their enemy "what he deserves" and appearing to condone mob lynchings. There were also references to his being treated for psychological problems at a hospital in Canada.

Aristide and his aides adamantly denied the charges, and independent reports suggested the CIA had obtained much of its information from Haitian army sources. Press investigations revealed that Aristide had never been treated in a Canadian hospital, and that CIA officials had visited Haiti during a time of severe military repression but reported "no evidence" of such problems. Yet Clinton and his top aides, buffeted by Pentagon and congressional criticism, had few palatable options before them and seemed unable to regain control of a policy that was rapidly unraveling amid internal conflicts.

The exiled president, always reticent and abstract in his pronouncements, did little to defend himself publicly as the revived charges of instability and radicalism swirled around him. Moreover, his insistence on clinging to his mantle of moral authority and mass popularity, while rejecting any further compromise with the military or civilian right after his return to power was aborted, undercut efforts by diplomats and some of his own top aides to broker a political solution. His aides argued that Aristide had made numerous concessions to the military, especially by agreeing to a broad amnesty for the coup leaders, and that the army and its rightist allies had no right to make political demands after violently defying the will of Haitian voters and the international community.

In sharp contrast to this purist stance, Malval, the low-key businessman whom Aristide had named as prime minister in August, worked feverishly throughout the fall to bridge the gap between Aristide's camp and opposition forces in Haiti. Although unable to gain physical access to the National Palace and forced to work from his heavily guarded suburban home, Malval conferred repeatedly with Cédras, right-wing leaders, and members of parliament, looking for common ground with Aristide and his followers. Working closely with United States officials, he urged the president to "broaden" his government by allowing some opposition figures to play a role, and in December he proposed a conference of "national reconciliation" in Haiti, inviting all political sectors to participate.

Malval often described himself as playing the role of the nation's "psychiatrist," trying to interpret and

unravel the highly-charged, psychologically polarized knot of Haitian politics. His chief goal was to reduce the mutual fears between Aristide and his adversaries, to convince both sides that they could coexist and resolve their conflicts without resorting to state repression or mob violence. But Malval's task was virtually impossible in a nation gripped by paranoia and hatred, where personal fears and loyalties were far more potent political forces than any public institutions or covenants, and where the international will to back up his efforts was evidently lacking.

In mid-December, Malval returned to Haiti from a negotiating trip to Washington and Europe in a state of visible frustration and despair, announcing that his hopes for a national conference had been dashed and that he was resigning, as he had threatened to do for weeks. He bitterly criticized Aristide for failing to support him, accusing the president of preferring to remain in righteous exile rather than accept reality and return to the bargaining table. In turn, Aristide's aides countered that Aristide had fallen prey to the manipulations of officials in Washington who sought to dilute his power as president and force him to return as a figurehead.

As the pathetic denouement played out, United States officials publicly clung to the slim hope that more diplomatic and economic pressure would eventually squeeze the army into submission. But most observers privately believed the window of opportunity for change and compromise had already shut—and that the forces of the authoritarian past had won. Haiti's hopes for rescue from years of poverty and oppression, briefly buoyed by the election of a charismatic hero, have probably been dashed for the foreseeable future by a combination of vicious politics in a deeply polarized nation, international misunderstanding and miscalculation of Haitian realities, reluctance by foreign democracies to intervene in a third world controversy, and conflicting policy agendas and ideological views among American officials.

As the grim truth dawns on a desperate populace—that Aristide is not coming back, that the Duvalierist era is returning with a vengeance, and that the international community has essentially washed its hands of their plight—the potential for violent political conflict and a resurgent northward tide of unwelcome refugees will only continue to grow. At the same time, the ability of a small, poorly equipped army to thwart the will of the United States and the UN has weakened the credibility of Western commitment to democratic development abroad—and sent a disturbing message of indifference to reactionary forces throughout the hemisphere. ■

The January uprising in Chiapas has galvanized Mexican political thought and forced the country to face a fundamental issue: "For decades, the conventional wisdom about Mexico held that democratization... would threaten political stability in a land with a fearsome history of bloody uprisings. Today, democratization seems the only guarantor of stability and peace."

Mexico: Zapatista Thunder

BY LUCY CONGER

On January 11, 10 days after guerrillas calling themselves the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) launched bold attacks on five towns and an army barracks in the southern state of Chiapas, television newscaster Jorge Ramos fired a pointed question at a Mexican official. "Señor consul, is the government concerned that in this election year people might want to vote for an opposition party because it might bring peace instead of staying with the ruling [Institutional Revolutionary] party (PRI), that has brought war to the country?"

With that single question, Ramos put the PRI's much-touted record of 65 years of social peace on the line. His question reflects the severe credibility crisis at home and abroad for the administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari that was unleashed in two explosive weeks of fighting by the Zapatista guerrillas. Salinas himself had achieved an image control with the press that nearly matched that enjoyed by American President Ronald Reagan in his heyday. But suddenly his grasp on events had slipped. "Before, it was as though he was a type of king, or God, who made no mistakes and all he touched ran marvelously, like a magician. Now we know that was a very partial view. We focused on the economic situation in general and lost sight of the social question," noted Salinas sympathizer Susan Kaufman Purcell, the vice president for Latin American affairs at the Americas Society.

In late January a worried Salinas scurried off to an international financial community meeting in Davos, Switzerland, seeking to reassure investors. His message was that the guerrilla conflict was localized in Chiapas and that a political pact signed just before the meeting

would guarantee peaceful presidential and congressional elections in August. Despite those calming words, the Zapatista army, a predominantly indigenous force several thousand strong, has moved the conflict beyond the Chiapas borders by pushing its priorities to the top of the national agenda. In their "Declaration of War," the guerrillas raised the social question by demanding jobs, housing, health, and education for Mexico's impoverished indigenous peoples, and made an unequivocal demand for honest elections this year. They have created a new imperative for democratic reforms in Mexico that will make the August presidential race the most contentious ever and holds out the possibility of ending the nearly seven decades of continuous rule by the PRI.

It remains to be seen whether Mexico can stage clean elections, but what is already clear since the Chiapas uprising is that Salinas and his Institutional Revolutionary party are moving faster toward political reform than in the previous five years of his administration. The crisis exposed the lack of political sensibility among Salinas's inner circle of technocrats. Salinas initially responded with force, sending the army in to retake towns held by the Zapatistas. Within days, the army was under attack in the national and foreign press for alleged human rights violations, including bombing of civilian areas, summary executions, and torture. Ten days after the conflict broke out the Salinas administration regained its balance and began moving aggressively to recover the political initiative and press for the pacification of the conflict. A key move was the appointment of Manuel Camacho, the last remaining *político* in the Salinas camp, as peace commissioner. The toppling of the hard-line interior minister and the weak Chiapas interim governor and the announcement of a unilateral army cease-fire reversed the initial military response and made clear the government's intention of seeking a political solution. The rebellion, which claimed as many as 400 lives in initial fighting, brought tens of thousands of citizens out for marches calling

LUCY CONGER, Mexico correspondent for Institutional Investor magazine and Jornal do Brasil newspaper, has reported on Mexican politics and economics for the past 10 years. The author thanks Jornal do Brasil for granting permission to include material published in the newspaper.

for a truce and peace talks. Opposition politicians tried to capitalize on the popular demand for peace, and the government benefited from the outcry against violence, which helped isolate the armed movement. Within two weeks, the government and the guerrillas had accepted Bishop Samuel Ruiz of San Cristóbal de las Casas, a longtime champion of the Chiapas Indians, as a peace mediator, and one month after the fighting began both sides had reached agreement about the conditions and agendas for peace talks.

The new reality in Mexico was summarized in dramatic and moving terms in a letter sent to the rebel army by 280 organizations belonging to the State Indigenous and Peasant Council of Chiapas. "After a long night that appeared to have no end, it took the Zapatista thunder to clear the darkness and aspire to the future with a new light," they wrote in an endorsement of the guerrillas' demands for freedom, justice, and democracy, especially for Mexico's indigenous and peasant peoples. The changed political landscape is evident in the new political actors that have been moved into key leadership positions and are believed capable of implementing meaningful political reform. And in an apparent strategy shift, the guerrillas pledged they would "not impede" the August presidential elections, holding out the prospect that the vote could take place normally. But in the wake of the Chiapas uprising, all of Mexico is asking: "What is normal now?"

"CHIAPAS IS MEXICO"

The violent uprising stunned officials and citizens alike, but no one was surprised that the insurgency arose in Chiapas. Tucked away in the far southeastern corner of the country, Chiapas was part of Guatemala until it joined Mexico in 1824. Chiapas is Mexico's poorest state, home to 1 million impoverished Indians who eke out a spartan living as small farmers, day laborers, charcoal-makers, and artisans. The legacy of centuries of malnutrition is painfully obvious: most of the Indians are less than five feet tall. More than 30 percent of the state's 3.2 million inhabitants are illiterate, 32 percent speak only an Indian language, and 72 percent of schoolchildren do not complete first grade. Although the state produces 55 percent of Mexico's hydroelectric power, 34 percent of homes have no electricity. The indigenous are the victims of countless land disputes in which feudal land barons, known as *caciques*, send bands of armed men to evict Indians from their lands. Violence is institutionalized through links between the *caciques* and local officials, who typically turn a deaf ear to the land disputes and intimidate or jail priests and other advocates who defend the Indians' land struggles. "The origins of the armed movement of Chiapas are in actions that were stimulated by the government," which for decades has ignored the Indians' claims for land and justice, writes

political columnist Miguel Angel Granados Chapa in Mexico City's *Reforma* newspaper. Curiously, the highest voter support for the PRI in the 1988 election was won in this state of poverty and discrimination where, according to official election results, more than 90 percent of voters backed the ruling party. But as political analyst Alberto Aziz Nassif has noted, in Chiapas "thousands of votes [were] extracted by a fraudulent administration of elections made by PRI."

Among government officials and financiers and businessmen, it has become popular to refer to the Zapatista uprising as the "Chiapas incident." While Chiapas may be physically isolated from the rest of Mexico, and living conditions may be miserable in the extreme, the state's problems now permeate national life. Many Mexicans point to the hardships of life in Chiapas as emblematic of what is wrong with Mexico's economic model, which has catapulted 11 men to billionaire status while confining 43 million Mexicans to a life of poverty. "Chiapas es México" is a new slogan born of the crisis, and it is a bitter retort to the government's attempts to defend its stringent economic policies that have lowered inflation, sold off state-owned enterprises, and ended federal budget deficits while failing to stimulate robust growth, create jobs, or combat poverty.

It is telling that no one in government, from President Salinas down, has questioned the legitimacy of the Zapatista army demands for jobs and social programs as well as independence, freedom, democracy, justice, and peace. PRI presidential contender Luis Donaldo Colosio, who led the government's antipoverty program before he was named the party's candidate, said that social programs have been "insufficient to eradicate the ancestral poverty" in Chiapas. The bitter conditions that fueled the Chiapas uprising exist in many other regions in Mexico and afflict indigenous groups that live in 27 of the country's 31 states, posing the threat that unrest could spread.

Mexicans have taken the Chiapas crisis to heart. In 10 years of reporting in Mexico, I have never seen friends and acquaintances so shaken or moved. "It is clear to me that the [government's] economic program benefits me, but morally it is not fair that my indigenous countrymen are fighting for land," said one. Teachers have stormed out of classrooms enraged with students who refuse to admit to racism against Indians, and artists and scholars say they cannot sleep and suffer nightmares because of the uprising. "Chiapas has awakened a social conscience that was asleep because we did not see the possibility of change," says Fernanda Navarro, a philosophy professor at the Nicolaita University in Morelia, Michoacán.

A DEMOCRATIC REFORM?

With pressure from the Zapatistas bearing down, two important steps were taken in late January that

could make the presidential election credible and prevent bitter postelection disputes that might turn violent. On January 27 Mexico's three leading political parties and five of six small parties signed a "Pact for Peace, Democracy, and Justice," saying that honest elections acceptable to civil society and political parties are "a necessary condition" for establishing a "just and durable peace." To gain credibility for the elections, the eight parties pledged to adopt measures that would promote clean elections and "establish mechanisms that give full reliability to the voter registration roll." Ever since the tainted 1988 presidential election, which millions of Mexicans believe was won by opposition leader Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the voter rolls have been the focus of bitter controversy. Leaders of the conservative National Action party (PAN) and the liberal Democratic Revolution party (PRD) charge the voter rolls are larded with names of dead people and riddled with inaccuracies that prevent eligible voters from voting. Election credibility will be enhanced by the appointment in January of Jorge Carpizo, a respected jurist, as interior minister and final arbiter of the balloting.

The pact also calls on the Zapatistas to put down their arms and enter public life as a political force. Peace Commissioner Manuel Camacho pressed this issue on the guerrillas by calling the EZLN a "political force in formation" in a statement that outlined his plan for peace negotiations. The pact recognizes the political parties as the representative force on the question of democratic reform, and aims to keep the issue of national democratization out of the peace talks.

The agreement demonstrates movement toward political reform, a topic that was taboo as recently as a few months ago. The significance of the pact lies in its intention to negotiate details and its acceptance of the principle of promoting a legal reform that would set out stringent election procedures to eliminate the present system of PRI control of election review boards. The reform debate would also raise the sensitive issue of accepting international election observers. Finally, the pact recognizes the authenticity of opposition candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and the PRD. Through the pact, the government and the PRI "have accepted that you can't have a clean election without a fuss if Cárdenas is not on board" and this grants Cárdenas a kind of veto power over reform measures, says political scientist Jorge G. Castañeda. But others caution against a premature celebration of the end of the state-party regime. They point to the desire of Salinas and his group to retain control of the political system and emphasize the key elements of political reform remain undefined. "I prefer to see that which I do not desire: the regime does not want to make true changes," writes historian Enrique Krauze.

Another important step toward democratization

received a new impetus from pressures created by the guerrilla uprising. On January 26, PRI candidate Colosio pledged that he will support clean elections and a program of 20 democratic reforms that are being proposed to all presidential candidates by a nonpartisan movement led by intellectuals, politicians, artists, and citizen activists. Colosio's endorsement of the civil society document, "20 Pledges for Democracy," is significant because the reforms would weaken the PRI's hold on power, reduce presidential powers, and pave the way for a system of checks and balances by creating greater independence in the legislative and judicial branches of government.

A POSTMODERN GUERRILLA

The Zapatista National Liberation Army is unlike any other Latin American guerrilla movement, and in its short public life has shown a flexibility and moderation previously unknown in the hemisphere. The Zapatistas distinguished their movement with their ready willingness to engage in peace talks. Only one week after taking up arms, the guerrilla leadership responded favorably to government offers to hold a dialogue to debate the EZLN agenda of social and economic demands, a cease-fire, and political participation for indigenous and other citizens. Three weeks after their initial attacks, the Zapatistas announced a major strategy shift in a communiqué that reversed their initial demands for the overthrow of Salinas and the army and pledged they "will not impede the elections of 1994."

The Zapatistas launched their uprising in unusual times, historian Lorenzo Meyer points out. "The EZLN [rebellion] is the first postmodern rebellion of Latin America. The first that is born not only in postcommunism but also, and this is important, [born] in post-anticommunism," Meyer wrote in the newspaper *Exélsior*. In this context, the Zapatistas explicitly renounced the standard leftist goals of leading revolution and taking power. "There are and there will be other revolutionary organizations. We do not intend to be the one, sole, and true historic vanguard," said an EZLN communiqué published January 25. This sharply unorthodox approach reflects a keen reading of the political climate by the Zapatistas, who can maximize their impact by seizing the precise moment for striking—the election year—and have now chosen to join the growing clamor for honest elections and democratization, analysts say.

The "public face" of the EZLN is SubComandante Marcos, a tall man who wears a ski mask that reveals only his green eyes and part of his prominent nose. The subcomandante, who spoke from behind his mask to a dazed crowd of residents and tourists in the plaza of San Cristóbal de las Casas on New Year's Day, has captured the popular imagination through the bold moves of the Zapatistas and through a dozen communi-

qués that reveal a direct, powerful writing style and a sense of humor heretofore concealed by most Latin American guerrillas. In a sharply worded communiqué that warned the army it would have to kill every Zapatista to eradicate the guerrilla command, the insurgent subcomandante fired a potshot at Mexican insensitivity to the indigenous: "A question: Will all of this serve so that at least the 'Mexicans' learn to say 'Chiapas' instead of 'Chapas' and say 'Tzeltales' instead of 'Setsales'?"

Public response to the guerrillas might be considered postmodern also. The Zapatistas have rekindled the romanticism classically associated with leftist movements, but have also stirred deep fears of social unrest and sparked massive protests renouncing the use of violence. Troubling questions hover over the movement about the source of the rebels' money and weapons, and the answers could shift public sentiment away from the Zapatistas.

CONTINUITY AS LIABILITY

The guerrilla conflict eclipsed the presidential campaign, which was officially kicked off in January. The Zapatista social and political demands challenge all candidates to revamp their rhetoric and platforms. PRI contender Luis Donaldo Colosio is under the most pressure to reformulate his program. Colosio was chosen as PRI candidate by Salinas because he best assured the continuity of the Salinas economic reforms. But in the redefined Mexico, continuity has become a political liability.

Doubts about the economic model that Colosio would carry forward have deepened since Chiapas. The Salinas reforms that privatized public companies, removed barriers to foreign competition, and created federal budget surpluses also left nearly half of all Mexicans living in poverty or extreme poverty. The Solidaridad program of public works and targeted food subsidies, which was run by Colosio, was created to alleviate the poverty spread by the modernizing liberal reforms. Solidaridad projects were to be a pillar of the PRI campaign. But once the spotlight of national attention was trained on the extreme poverty of Chiapas—which has received one of the highest levels of Solidarity funds—the flaws of the antipoverty program became apparent. The dusty Tzotzil Indian town of Chenalhó, Chiapas, is a case in point. In the past two years, Solidaridad came to Chenalhó, financed construction of a meeting hall for farmers, and built a public bathhouse that smells from two blocks away. But no jobs were created, and the local priest says farmers lack production credits. Many of the Tzotziles of Chenalhó scratch out a bare existence growing corn and coffee on the steep hillsides above town; many others are forced to emigrate to the adjoining states of Tabasco and Oaxaca to get work in construction or other jobs. "They stay away for two or three months and come

back when they've earned some money and go away again when they've spent it," Felipe Abarca Villafuerte, a primary school teacher, told foreign reporters.

The Colosio campaign got off to a lackluster start. On February 1, he made a good effort to drape himself in the mantle of justice. In a campaign speech at Ananecuilco, the birthplace of revolutionary hero Emiliano Zapata, Colosio intoned, "The claim, beliefs, and yearnings [of Zapata] are still in force; his call demands a reply. The cry of 'Land and Liberty' is still today a demand for justice, it is a condition for peace, for stability of the country, and for prevailing over poverty." The candidate went on to promise a new strategy of governing, but offered no compelling details. The government's credibility crisis offers Colosio an opportunity to strike out in new directions and create his own identity and platform independent of Salinas. If he cannot meet the challenge, his campaign may languish.

The presidential contest could face another earthquake before the final deadline in July for registration of candidates. The appointment of former Colosio rival Manuel Camacho as peace commissioner has given him national prominence and popularity, and has fueled widespread speculation that Camacho will launch himself as a presidential contender. The former mayor of Mexico City, Camacho was so bitterly disappointed when he lost the PRI presidential nomination to Colosio that he staged an unorthodox public protest and hinted he would leave government. Back in the limelight and active in his preferred role as a protagonist, he stands to win great popularity as the man who may restore political stability. As peace talks began in February, Camacho remained a wild card in the election. He still nurtures presidential ambitions, but the scenarios for his candidacy are highly problematic, and Salinas himself spoke out to re-endorse the Colosio candidacy and quash the rumors that Camacho might replace Colosio as PRI's presidential choice. Even if he ran on another party's ticket, a Camacho candidacy would divide the PRI at the very least. An important motive for Salinas's choice of Colosio was the need to maintain unity in the PRI. Paradoxically, Camacho's rehabilitation as peace commissioner has re-ignited his followers and stirred up one of the most severe divisions the party has faced.

The leading opposition parties enter the election fray with handicaps: The Democratic Revolution party is still struggling to unify factions that range from socialists to PRI defectors, but its internal divisions are not likely to detract votes from its candidate, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who led the strongest challenge ever against PRI in the jiggered 1988 election. The National Action party has chosen as candidate Diego Fernández de Cevallos, a man who lacks a popular following, and it lost respected independent-minded leaders last year in an internal dispute over the party's cooperation with Salinas's policies. Both parties must compete against

the awesome PRI behemoth with its overpowering economic resources and nationwide election machine. A deeper problem for all the parties is the issue of representativity at a time when Mexicans increasingly prefer to affiliate with nonpartisan special interest groups—and when burgeoning civil society has seized the initiative on many pressing issues such as government accountability and human rights.

The strongest threat to Colosio is Cárdenas, who drew 31 percent of the vote in 1988, according to official results. Cárdenas has tirelessly stumped the country for the past six years, and is expected to make a strong showing once again. It would take exceptional circumstances to bring about a Cárdenas victory, but exceptional circumstances are closer at hand than at almost any time in PRI history. Cárdenas's presidential bid could be boosted by fractures in the PRI, resentment against the party's perpetual rule, continuing economic hardships, unexpected fallout from the Zapatista presence, and a direct appeal to a broad constituency, including small political parties and nonpartisan civic groups.

THE NEW POLITICAL PLAYERS

As in other countries, new political forces are emerging in Mexico that will be important players in the election. The struggle to forge alliances across parties and with citizen groups is central to the country's political reorganization. The discipline of corporate groups and straight party voting are crumbling as part of the shift toward democracy. The PRI still counts thousands of labor and peasant organizations among its corporatist affiliates, but the 1988 election proved that their loyalty at the ballot box is questionable. Cárdenas has already lined up the backing of right-wing Foro Democrático Nacional, a breakaway from the National Action party, and several small socialist parties. Last July the Democratic Revolution party endorsed a Cárdenas initiative to reserve up to 50 percent of its federal and state candidacies for independents drawn from popular organizations, advocacy groups, and prominent independent people respected for their leadership in promoting democratic reforms.

On February 5, below the imposing arches of the Monument to the Revolution in Mexico City, Cárdenas announced the creation of the National Democratic Alliance (ADN), a pluralistic coalition that includes parties ranging across the political spectrum and scores of local civic and labor organizations, and the Citizens Movement for Democracy, a national coalition of 150 urban community associations, peasant leagues, and ecology and human rights groups. In its "Charter for Democratic Change," the ADN sets as its goal an end to the "corporatist and authoritarian system" and the election of a pluralist Congress that would draft a new constitution and promote an equitable social policy; these would be the pillars of a transition to democracy,

says ADN organizer Joel Ortega. The Alliance is an open movement aimed principally at uniting civic associations and advocacy groups that can organize a massive popular campaign to monitor the presidential election and protest election fraud.

Skepticism about the possibility of clean elections runs deep and wide. A recent opinion poll showed that 71 percent of respondents expect the elections, which absent reforms will be supervised by PRI-controlled agencies, to be dirty. Consequently, citizen mobilization for honest elections could be the decisive factor in setting up a credible vote and dampening protest over the outcome. The validity of the election will depend heavily on "the influential group of analysts and national and foreign citizen groups that will monitor the process," writes Carlos Ramírez, senior political columnist at Mexico City's *El Financiero* newspaper. The Zapatista army will also put pressure on the elections, kindling the threat of electoral unrest if the official vote count is cast in doubt.

The Zapatista movement has breathed new life into the burgeoning civil society by giving an urgency to the insistent but until now little-heard popular demands for fair elections, government accountability, and citizen participation in a political system dominated by presidential power and the PRI. But the guerrilla uprising creates new imperatives if the community and farmer associations, urban groups, and special interest advocates that make up civil society are to retain credibility with the majority of Mexicans who are poor. "Civil society now has the word, but its agenda [had been] minimal and exclusively aimed at the transition to democracy. Now, civil society must take on simultaneously the struggle for justice, and for democracy," says Miguel Alvarez, a member of the Citizens Movement for Democracy.

THE NOT SO ROSY ECONOMY

Complicating the political panorama for this year is the dull economic outlook. The high expectations that Salinas stirred up in selling the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which went into effect January 1, could prove elusive if investors shy away from a troubled Mexico. Growth is expected to reach 3 percent—at most 3.5 percent—this year, an inadequate level for Mexico, where the estimated 2.2 percent population growth rate absorbs most economic expansion, and where UN agencies report that annual growth of 6.7 percent is required to create enough jobs to employ the growing labor force. NAFTA was a leading motive for the Chiapas uprising, and was denounced resoundingly by the Zapatistas for job losses it is expected to cause among Mexican farmers likely to be displaced by imports of cheap United States corn. In the short run, NAFTA's greater opening to foreign competition could drive some Mexican industries out of business. Unemployment has increased in

the past two years, and more Mexicans are expected to lose their jobs this year, swelling the informal economy that some analysts say employs up to 25 percent of working Mexicans. The Salinas opening has made Mexico highly dependent on foreign investment to pay for a trade deficit that is estimated to reach \$18 billion in 1994. As in recent years, the stock market is expected to turn in a positive performance during the year, but as the Chiapas crisis painfully shows, growth in the financial sector does not filter down to the needy. Now the government is speeding up social spending and some say may slip into a deficit.

Months before the uprising, Salinas had pledged to lighten the austerity burden imposed on voters by the liberal economic reform. The anti-inflation program for 1994 includes measures that would reduce taxes and fuel costs for consumers and allow for real increases in certain wage categories. Discontent among middle-class professionals who see no prospect for economic advancement is rampant, and they could become an important anti-PRI constituency if the economy remains weak.

OF MASKED MEN AND MASKED TRUTHS

Mexico has a rich tradition of masked men leading popular causes. Recently, SuperBarrio, a masked maverick who dresses like the popular *lucha libre* wrestlers, was born out of the ashes of the 1985 Mexico City earthquake. He defends the homeless in their fight for housing aid and stands at the side of inner city renters battling eviction. SubComandante Marcos now joins the gallery of masked would-be reformers. His mask has become controversial as peace negotiator Camacho has demanded that Marcos bare his face at the peace talks. Marcos replied fiercely to the demand that he take off his mask. "Why such a fuss over the ski mask? Is Mexican political culture not the 'culture of the veiled?,'" he asked, alluding to the traditional secrecy

that shrouds the naming of PRI presidential candidates. The subcomandante issued a challenge: "I am willing to take off my ski mask if Mexican society will take off its mask" and reexamine its images of "modernity" to reconcile the third world that is Chiapas with Salinas's claims that Mexico is entering the first world.

The subcomandante may remain masked, but the movement that he leads is unmasking painful truths about Mexico. "The rebellion uncovered the degree of simulation and lies in which we live," exposing racism and the impossibility of "organizing a modernization program against the people or [based on] their ignorance," writes political commentator José Agustín Ortiz Pinchetti in *La Jornada* newspaper. For decades, the state-party system dominated by the PRI has been politely called "*democracia a la mexicana*," a euphemism for a pluralistic political charade in which the PRI holds nearly all the cards. As these and other masks come off in Mexico, a new possibility comes into view: honest and competitive elections that could create a pluralistic democracy.

The Chiapas crisis demonstrates an overwhelming popular rejection of violence and potential resilience on both sides of the conflict. Under the Salinas administration's technocrats, political institutions may be creaking but they are not yet brittle. Salinas again adopted bold moves characteristic of his leadership and pushed for a peaceful solution to the conflict. The Zapatista guerrillas made agile responses to proposals for negotiations, and recognized that meeting their demands for justice will take time. But the deadline for clean elections is fixed. For decades, the conventional wisdom about Mexico held that democratization of the state-party regime would threaten political stability in a land with a fearsome history of bloody uprisings. Today, democratization seems the only guarantor of stability and peace. ■

Following are excerpts from the testimony of Juan E. Méndez, the executive director of Human Rights Watch/Americas, before the United States House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs on Wednesday, February 2, 1994.

Human Rights and the Chiapas Rebellion

BY HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AMERICAS

The emergence of an armed rebellion in Chiapas at the end of this century and after the end of the cold war may seem an incongruity. In fact, however, it has forced public opinion in Mexico and elsewhere to come to grips with reality in a country that is attempting a giant leap into modernity while leaving behind large segments of the population who fear they are being marginalized. Chiapas is not only the poorest state in the Mexican federation; it is also the state in which the administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari has spent the most in social programs without seeming to make much of a dent on the desperate poverty of its people. It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the rebellion only to these two factors. There are other parts of Mexico that also are very poor and where social spending does not seem to alleviate the growing disparity in income distribution and lifestyles.

In Chiapas and in some other parts of Mexico, there are long-standing conflicts over land tenure and use of natural resources. In Chiapas more than anywhere else, those conflicts are usually resolved through skulduggery and abuse of governmental power. The Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI) in Chiapas bears little resemblance to the image of modernization and controlled opening that Salinas had carefully cultivated. In Chiapas, rural bosses with close ties to the PRI (*caciques*) own not only the land; they also own the local police, civil authorities, and judges. Indian communities are deprived of ancestral lands, and peasants are increasingly left landless. Disputes over land are resolved by force, and social and political organizations that are formed to represent peasants are ruthlessly persecuted. . .

In our view, a pervasive culture of human rights violations has marked PRI rule in Chiapas. Not only has the PRI continued to govern Chiapas as if the much-touted modernization of Mexico was not applicable there; it has also managed to implicate national institutions in its despotic policies. The Mexican army has been deployed in Chiapas for several years on the pretext of securing the border with Guatemala and conducting drug interdiction and crop eradication

operations. In fact, the army has been used to intervene on the side of the *caciques* in disputes over land and natural resources.

The Chiapas PRI, on the other hand, is by no means an aberration. Suspiciously, the party earns the largest electoral victories in Chiapas, despite the protracted civil unrest. Perhaps for that reason, Chiapas contributes significantly to the national leadership of the PRI. Until January 10, 1994, the all-powerful federal Ministry of the Interior was in the hands of Patrocinio González Garrido, who had taken a leave of absence the year before from his governorship of Chiapas to accept the position.

Chiapas, therefore, is at the same time representative of national trends in Mexico and the most extreme example of the volatile nature of some of these trends. That is why the New Year's rebellion has shaken Mexico's self-confidence and has shown the country's social and political problems in naked realism. It has called into question the unjustified optimism in the United States and elsewhere about Mexico's immediate future. On the other hand, the events unfolding in the south of Mexico present a challenge to Mexico's political establishment and have the potential of prompting definitive reforms that could ultimately bring Mexico to a well-earned seat among the world's democracies.

GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Summary executions: There is mounting evidence that Mexican armed or security forces committed acts of summary execution against Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) guerrillas or suspects. The best-documented case took place in the marketplace in Ocosingo at the end of the EZLN occupation of that city between January 1 and January 3. The international media photographed and filmed the bodies of at least five young men who bore clear signs of having been shot at close range, execution-style, and of having had their wrists bound. Forensic specialists from Mexico's National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH) have acknowledged that their deaths occurred *hors de combat*. Doctor Clyde Snow, an authority on forensic

anthropology who reviewed the evidence for Physicians for Human Rights, has said that four of the men were shot at close range in the back of the head while kneeling; one was shot on the side of his head. The weapon used was a handgun, and the caliber of the bullets is consistent with the sidearm used by army personnel. The marketplace had been the site of a fierce battle between the EZLN and the police and the army. The army took control of the marketplace by Tuesday, January 4, at the latest. The bodies were found after that. The investigation is proceeding, but we are discouraged that it has been assigned to a military court.

At the end of the occupation of San Cristóbal de las Casas, some EZLN members commandeered a bus that was attacked by the army. Journalists who visited the site reported seeing more than a dozen bodies lying outside the bus, and said that some of them had their faces blown off. We believe it unlikely that such wounds could have been sustained in combat, especially if the corpses were found not inside the bus but a few feet away. We are not aware of any autopsies conducted in this case, nor is there any exhumation planned, to our knowledge.

Disappearances: Army sweeps in many towns and hamlets have resulted in massive arrests. Many families have come to the urban centers of Chiapas looking for information on the status and whereabouts of those detained. In some cases they have been able to locate them, but there are many reports of persons who are still missing after their capture. For example, on January 20, the Mexico City-based Fray Francisco de Vitoria Center for Human Rights reported the detention and disappearance of 12 persons. In a press release issued on January 25, the CNDH said that it had received 400 requests for information on the whereabouts of detained persons, and had solved 278; it was still trying to locate the remaining 122. (On January 15 the CNDH had said it was looking into 231 complaints of disappearance.)

Because the government was not forthcoming with the names of persons known to it to be dead, wounded, or in custody, it caused unconscionable distress to family members of disappeared persons. The CNDH partially reduced that distress in its January 25 press release in which it named two lists of persons detained under federal and state charges for crimes allegedly committed in the course of the rebellion. But it is inexcusable that neither the army, the federal or state prosecutors, nor prison authorities provided any response to the many desperate inquiries of relatives.

Torture and inhuman treatment: Many of those arrested and held under suspicion of involvement with the rebellion complained of interrogation techniques that included torture. They were held in abject conditions of imprisonment that amount to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment under relevant international

law standards. Our forthcoming report will include testimony gathered directly by our mission in January, and we expect to document the extent of the practice in the course of our second mission to Chiapas, starting next week.

Arbitrary arrest and due process violations: As stated earlier, army sweeps...resulted in massive arrests. Many villagers were taken from their homes without apparent probable cause that they were involved in the insurrection. After many public requests for information, on January 25 the CNDH reported that it had established that 131 persons had been arrested; of those, 58 were released and 70 were formally charged. The other three are minors who were sent to reformatories. These figures are based on court reports; they evidently do not include persons arrested by the army who have not yet been submitted to proper civilian authorities, or who were released eventually with no explanation. For example, in Morelia, Altamirano district, the army arrested 39 peasants, released only 7, and took the rest to Comitán.

Eighteen non-Mexicans (Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Honduran) were arrested and charged with violating immigration laws. In at least one case, in Oxchuc, the PRI mayor used the occasion of the army presence to arrest 16 members of a dissident organization of civil society called "Tres Nudos."

Violations of laws of war: Before the cease-fire, there were multiple reports of aerial bombing and strafing of hamlets and countryside dwellings, even though observers at the site reported no presence of guerrilla forces.

Eyewitnesses told our mission that, during the battle for control of Ocosingo, the army used helicopters to fire indiscriminately at civilian sites. The number of civilians who died in that battle is very high, suggesting that the army violated a cardinal obligation imposed by the laws of war: to minimize harm to the civilian population. Civilians must be given appropriate warning of impending attack, and must be given a chance to leave the area of fighting. Even when they are present at a battle site, it is the obligation of the attacker to apply the "rule of proportionality" by weighing the military necessity and importance of the objective to be achieved in the attack against the likelihood of harm to civilians. We believe that President Salinas should order an impartial civilian investigation of army actions in Ocosingo and elsewhere, and explain to the public how so many civilians died; if violations of these ever-present obligations can be confirmed, those responsible must be punished.

The army has occupied towns and hamlets and behaved abusively against those who live there. In the example of Morelia, the villagers have complained that many of them were threatened with execution, that soldiers ransacked common storage houses, killed their livestock, and prevented them from going to

certain parts of the town. Hamlets in and around Corralito were abandoned by their inhabitants as they were driven out by the bombing and strafing. Their homes were ransacked and all possessions of value were stolen or destroyed.

These actions have caused the displacement of hundreds of peasant families from areas of counterinsurgency operations. Many have sought refuge with Catholic and other churches in San Cristóbal, while others have fled to different areas of the state. The Mexican government has the responsibility of receiving the displaced population in good care, and to offer compensation for their losses and assistance in returning to their homes.

ZAPATISTA VIOLATIONS

As in other conflicts that we have monitored over the years, we hold the EZLN to their obligations under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The fact that they have decided to take up arms against the state instantly obliges them to respect standards that are codified in that norm, which is declarative of customary international law. These obligations are wholly independent of any particular status that the EZLN might enjoy in international law, and—it must be stressed—they are also not conditioned on the behavior of their adversary. In its declaration of war of January 1, 1994, the EZLN pledged to respect and be bound by the universally recognized laws of war.

The EZLN has taken hostages. They have held Absalón Castellanos, a retired army general and former governor of Chiapas, since the beginning of the war. Independent confirmation that he is alive and in EZLN custody was made only on January 31, when journalists were able to interview him in an undisclosed jungle location. The EZLN has announced that Castellanos is the only hostage they are holding. At first they had announced that he had been tried and found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment sharing the lives of the peasantry. On January 31, the EZLN announced its intention of exchanging him for captured guerrillas. We have repeatedly called on the EZLN to release him and other hostages. Castellanos is not a legitimate military target, since he plays no role in the hostilities. Holding him to affect the conduct of the enemy (that is, the release of EZLN combatants) meets the classic definition of hostage-taking, which is specifically prohibited by international humanitarian law.

During the brief occupation of Ocosingo, EZLN combatants also held a few prominent citizens hostage. One of them, ophthalmologist Francisco Talango, was killed by EZLN combatants when he tried to flee from the Ocosingo market. Since his arrest was a violation in any event, his murder is a serious breach of Common Article 3. The EZLN also burned houses and cars belonging to its hostages.

Even more seriously, they reportedly “shielded” themselves during combat by having civilians in their midst. According to eyewitnesses, some of these civilians may have chosen to stay with the EZLN because they sympathized with their cause. Even under that circumstance, the combatant has a duty to warn all civilians of possible risk, to allow those who choose to leave to do so, and not to retain anybody as a shield against attack. Those civilians who choose to remain in the path of battle assume the risk of harm, and it is not necessarily a violation of the laws of war if they become casualties. (We note here, in any event, that neither “shielding” nor voluntary presence of civilians at a military target operate to relieve the other side from its obligation to minimize harm to civilians. At all times the attacker is bound to apply the “rule of proportionality,” weighing the military advantage to be obtained by attacking the military target against the possible damage to be suffered by civilians.)

It has been reported that, in some cases, the EZLN engaged in forced recruitment of combatants. We are not in a position to confirm this at this time, but will attempt to document the practice in the course of our next mission.

It was also reported that EZLN forces fired on Mexican Red Cross personnel who were trying to rescue victims of the fighting, wounding two medics.

In the towns the EZLN occupied, they attacked nonmilitary targets such as local government buildings, setting fire to records and furniture. They also freed persons detained in local prisons.

CONCLUSION

[T]he search for a peaceful settlement in Chiapas must be supported. As a human rights organization, we are convinced that the best way to support the peace process is to urge the Mexican government to disclose everything that can be known about serious violations, and to live up to its obligations in domestic and international law to investigate them, and prosecute and punish those who are found to be responsible. We don't agree that the search for peaceful solutions necessitates either *de facto* or *de jure* amnesties or pardons. We are in favor of a generous policy of clemency for the crime of raising arms against the state; we will also support an amnesty for state officials who may have committed abuses of discretion as long as they have not caused enduring harm. But we steadfastly object to amnesties that have the effect of sweeping serious crimes under the rug, whether committed by the insurgents or by state agents. Disappearances, extrajudicial executions, widespread and severe torture, and grave breaches of the laws of war are war crimes or crimes against humanity, and governments have a duty to investigate, prosecute, and punish those responsible. ■

Nicaragua, a Soviet "beachhead" as President Ronald Reagan termed it; El Salvador and Guatemala under guerrilla siege, threatening to upset Honduras; the entire isthmus a potential source of hordes of illegal immigrants making their way to the United States to escape the tyranny of communism. Such was the image of Central America during the 1980s. Today we are told the region is "democratic," its future bright. But is this the case?

Central America's Enduring Conflicts

BY RICHARD L. MILLETT

The world's attention, heavily focused on Central America for much of the 1980s, is now devoted to other areas. The civil conflicts that devastated the region have subsided. The military establishments that dominated politics and committed massive human rights abuses still exist, but their power and influence have begun to decline and pressure to hold officers accountable for their actions is increasing. The United States, no longer perceiving Central America as a vital security concern, has reduced economic and military assistance. Concerns over the European banana market and the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have replaced fears of communism or United States intervention on the agenda of most regional leaders. Elections are held regularly, and though far from perfect no longer produce the traditional allegations of massive fraud and intimidation. On the surface, Central America seems to have undergone profound transformation.

But many of the conditions that produced those conflicts remain. Aside from Costa Rica and perhaps Belize, the vast majority of the region's population still lives in grinding poverty, in many cases under conditions even worse than during the 1970s. Unemployment remains high, a large percentage of people in rural areas still have no land, and education continues to be largely the preserve of urban elites. While political violence has declined it has by no means ended, and in most cases those responsible are never brought to trial. At the same time, common crime has increased steadily, leaving the average citizen threatened and insecure. Corruption is a major problem, judicial systems barely function, and civilian leadership is often weak and divided.

The effects of more than a decade of violent conflicts can be seen throughout the region. There is hardly an institution, a political faction, or even an extended family that has not been traumatized by the events of the 1980s. The infrastructure is badly worn, land mines continue to kill innocent peasants in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and individuals and groups of all political persuasions still use murder as a means of settling political disputes. The past dozen years also produced notable ecological degradation, with forests destroyed, soil eroded, land poisoned, water supplies imperiled, and even evidence of the beginnings of potentially disastrous climatic changes.

Not every trend is negative. By the latter half of 1993 the region's governments had managed to curb inflation and—with the notable exception of Nicaragua—restored at least a modicum of economic growth. A growing majority of Central Americans have become convinced that political violence offers no solution to their problems. The tendency to see Washington as the cause and/or potential solution to all the region's problems has begun to decline. Civilian institutions are notably stronger and more sophisticated than they were a dozen years ago, in part because politicians, intellectuals, labor, and church leaders have developed an extensive network of international contacts.

Ties have also been forged between regional leaders, aiding the settlement of long-running disputes such as that over the Honduran-Salvadoran border, and leading to modest progress in efforts to reactivate the Central American Common Market. Perhaps most significantly, the long history of armed conflicts between Central American nations seems, for the moment at least, to have come to an end.

While wars have ended, divisions and rivalries have not. Efforts at integration have been hampered by suspicion, conflicting interests, and differing agendas. A pattern has emerged, with Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala pushing ahead faster and showing more interest in political as well as economic integration, while Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and—to the extent

RICHARD L. MILLETT, a professor of history at Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville, and a senior research associate at the University of Miami's North-South Center, is co-author with Mark Falcoff of *Searching for Panama: The U.S. Relationship and the Challenge of Democratization* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).

they are involved at all—Panama and Belize, are much more cautious on economic integration and notably unenthusiastic about political integration.

COSTA RICA: NO INSULATION

Costa Rica has long provided a stark contrast to its poorer and more violent northern neighbors. With a tradition of free elections, no regular professional military, high levels of literacy, and relatively extensive social welfare programs, it has both feared and felt superior to the other nations of the region. Costa Rica's democratic traditions enabled it to avoid most of the violence of the 1980s. The peacemaking efforts of President Oscar Arias Sanchez helped end the danger of regional war and won him the Nobel Peace Prize. But burdened with debt and with a government bureaucracy it could not afford, the nation experienced severe economic strains during the 1980s and saw its standard of living decline. Added to this were problems associated with the influx of refugees, notably from Nicaragua, and with the growing use of Costa Rican territory by those engaged in the international narcotics trade.

Two events last year demonstrated again that Costa Ricans could not insulate themselves from the turmoil affecting their neighbors. In March a group of former contra guerrillas seized the Nicaraguan embassy in San Jose, holding hostage 10 employees, including the ambassador, for 13 days. The next month another group, claiming to be linked with Colombian drug traffickers, took 19 Supreme Court justices hostage; the kidnappers were captured and turned out to be Costa Ricans seeking money, with no apparent political motives. These acts of terrorism, combined with the 1992 kidnapping of the minister of public security by a Honduran, produced increased fears about security and exacerbated hostility toward refugees, already running high. They also dampened whatever enthusiasm Costa Ricans may have had for closer ties with the rest of Central America.

Despite these events, Costa Ricans continued to hold fast to their democratic traditions. The February 1994 presidential election was again a contest between the two perennial contending parties, the Social Christian Unity party and the National Liberation party. The latter ran Jose Maria Figueres, son of former President Jose Figueres, while the former put up Miguel Angel Rodriguez as its candidate. Concerned about economic and security problems and unhappy with the austerity measures of the incumbent Social Christian Unity administration, voters seemed ready to deliver a heavy majority for the National Liberation party. But in a manner reminiscent of campaigns in other nations, a swarm of personal accusations hurt Figueres's image and helped Rodriguez make it a close race (votes were still being tabulated as this issue went to press).

HONDURAS: KEEPING THE MILITARY IN LINE

Although its tradition of free elections is much more recent than Costa Rica's, Honduras also escaped the worst of Central America's violence. But it shares with its more turbulent neighbors their characteristic poverty and inequalities. It also has to deal with a top-heavy military establishment accustomed to operating without effective civilian control or judicial accountability. Persistent reports link the armed forces, which include and control the police, with narcotics trafficking. The military pension fund has taken over the national cement company and the army has appropriated much of the revenue from international telephone calls. Despite mounting criticism of corruption and continuing human rights violations, the military has been able to resist efforts to reduce its size, control its budget, and sever its ties with the police. Last month military units were deployed in the streets of Honduran cities, ostensibly in an effort to curb soaring crime rates; most observers, however, believed the real purpose of the exercise was to intimidate civilian critics.

Evidence implicating an army colonel in the 1991 rape and murder of a 17-year-old student became a focal point for resentment of military immunity. Efforts to block an investigation were thwarted by public pressure, supported and encouraged by United States Ambassador Crescencio Arcos. Ultimately the colonel was tried, convicted, and sentenced to 16 years in prison—an epic event that cracked, if it did not break, the wall of military immunity.

This case, concerns over corruption and crime, and fears of NAFTA's impact on the economy all played a role in last November's elections. The incumbent National party administration of President Rafael Leonardo Callejas had slowed inflation and curbed the budget deficit, but at the cost of reduced social expenditures and high unemployment. The party's presidential candidate, Osvaldo Ramos Soto, was easily defeated by the Liberal party's Carlos Roberto Reina, and Liberals regained control of the National Assembly.

The new administration faces formidable challenges in dealing with an entrenched and apprehensive military, mounting social and economic problems, and a steady decline in external assistance. Prospects for success were not enhanced when, in the wake of its electoral triumph, the Liberal party split into feuding factions. But at the very least, Hondurans could be proud that their fragile democratic institutions had again allowed a relatively peaceful and orderly transfer of power.

EL SALVADOR: TROUBLES WITH PEACE

Conditions in neighboring El Salvador were much more tense as that nation moved toward elections. The January 1992 peace agreement between the government and guerrillas grouped together in the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) was holding,

and the guerrillas had officially disarmed. Some progress was being made in creating a national civilian police that included former rebels and was independent of the armed forces.

As might be expected, problems developed in the implementation of the peace process. The guerrillas delayed destroying their anti-aircraft missiles, partly in response to the government's failure to carry out a promised purge of the officer corps. This became an even bigger issue last March when the United Nations-appointed Commission on the Truth for El Salvador issued its report, which condemned both government and guerrilla leaders for human rights abuses during the 12 years of civil conflict. Several military officers, including Defense Minister René Emilio Ponce, were directly linked to crimes such as the 1989 murder of six Jesuit priests. The commission recommended that those named in the report resign and be barred from holding public office for at least 10 years, that the Supreme Court resign and steps be taken to insure an independent judiciary, and that the international community establish a fund for victims of political violence.

The government reacted angrily to the report. The Supreme Court, which refused to resign, denounced it as biased and inaccurate, and the legislature, controlled by the right-wing Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), hurriedly passed a sweeping amnesty that not only gave immunity to those named in the report but also led to the release of officers previously convicted of involvement in the Jesuit murders. The FMLN, in contrast, generally accepted the report and agreed to abide by its recommendations. International pressure, notably from the administration of President Bill Clinton, which suspended military assistance, ultimately helped pressure President Alfredo Cristiani into retiring the officers named in the report.

While the government and the FMLN disagreed on the accuracy of the report and the proper response to it, they agreed on a fundamental point: the episode could not be allowed to derail or seriously disrupt the peace process and preparations for elections, scheduled for 1994. This consensus continued to hold last June when an explosion in Nicaragua revealed the existence of extensive FMLN arms caches, in direct violation of the terms of the peace agreement. The guerrillas accepted responsibility, revealed the locations of additional caches, and continued to work within the political system.

The murders of several former guerrillas and a lesser number of government officials in mid-1993 again appeared to put the process in jeopardy. The government said all killings of former guerrillas were acts of common crime, while the FMLN claimed the murders were political. The incompetence and anti-FMLN bias of existing police forces, combined with the slow progress in creating the new civilian police, made this issue even more sensitive. Revelations of government involvement

in wartime massacres and allegations that ARENA presidential candidate Armando Calderon Sol, the mayor of San Salvador, was linked to death squad activities, surfaced last fall, adding to the political tension.

Despite these problems, El Salvador's economy continued to revive. Preparations for 1994 remained on track and the UN announced it would send observers to monitor the elections. Much of the left and center-left, including the FMLN, united behind the presidential candidacy of Ruben Zamora, while the Christian Democrats, whose support appeared to be declining, again nominated former Foreign Minister Fidel Chavez Mena. Public unhappiness with spiraling crime rates, combined with the negative publicity surrounding the wartime activities of ARENA party leaders, made it possible that government candidate Calderon Sol would not obtain the necessary majority in the first round of elections and might be forced into a run-off, most likely against Zamora. Should that happen, El Salvador's peace process will once again be put to the test. As difficult as that test would be, events of the past year give reason to hope that the government and the former rebels will be able to keep the nation moving, however haltingly, toward peace and national reconstruction.

GUATEMALA: MORE TURMOIL AHEAD

The situation in Guatemala and Nicaragua is notably less hopeful. In Guatemala the region's last active insurgency continues, despite years of sporadic peace negotiations. In 1993 there were hopes that these talks would finally succeed. Mediation efforts by Guatemala's Roman Catholic Church, pressure from the international community for resolution of the conflict, and the negotiation of an agreement to facilitate the return of refugees from Mexico were encouraging signs. But as 1993 wore on neither side seemed anxious to conclude the process. The change of administrations in June revived hopes, but peace talks remained deadlocked. In December the government announced that negotiations would resume in early 1994, but the new year dawned with prospects for peace no better than they had been 12 months earlier.

The human rights situation followed a similar pattern. In the first half of 1993 the Guatemalan justice system showed signs of beginning to confront the issue, convicting individuals, including an army captain, involved in two widely publicized cases: the killings of anthropologist Myrna Mack and Michael Devine, an American citizen. While these convictions represented a step forward, their impact was limited because the cases involved individuals with powerful foreign contacts, because there was strong suspicion in both cases that higher-ups who had ordered the killings were being let off, and because the army captain convicted in the Devine case promptly escaped.

In the first months of 1993 the political situation in Guatemala grew increasingly tense. President Jorge Serrano's approval ratings had dropped precipitously during 1992 and showed no signs of reviving. The Christian Democratic and National Center Union parties, whose congressional delegations had worked with the president, broke with the administration. Confrontations between Serrano, the National Congress, and the media increased. Meanwhile crime soared, the economy remained stagnant, the trade deficit widened, and the currency declined in value. Victories by the president's party in local elections last May apparently encouraged Serrano to believe he could count on popular support if he moved against his critics and assumed semidictatorial powers.

On May 25 the president announced that he was suspending the constitution "temporarily and partially." Charging that he had "been subjected to blackmail by some members of Congress," Serrano claimed his actions would enable him to combat corruption and crime, reform the judicial system, and implement needed constitutional reforms.

The president counted on the support of the military and of much of the citizenry, including the business community, which was frustrated with the existing political stalemate. He also hoped the international community would accept his actions, just as it had tolerated similar ones by Peru's president, Alberto Fujimori, in 1992. But he had miscalculated on both counts. The United States and other nations denounced the coup and suspended assistance programs. The OAS pressed for a return to democratic rule, sending Secretary General Joao Baena Soares to Guatemala to warn the government of the potential consequences of its actions.

Alarmed by the threat posed to the economy, businesspeople refused to support Serrano. Instead they joined a strange coalition composed of moderate politicians; left-wing popular organizations; Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú; the government's human rights ombudsman, Ramiro de Leon Carpio; Edward Mulet, the Guatemalan ambassador to the United States; and representatives of the media. Loosely grouped into the National Forum for Consensus, this alliance provided a framework for mobilizing opposition. Its efforts were supported by the Constitutional Court, whose members evaded efforts to arrest them and from hiding issued decrees declaring Serrano's actions unconstitutional.

As popular opposition to the coup mounted, divisions in the military began to widen. In the end the high command withdrew its support, and on June 1 told Serrano to resign and leave the country. The vice president tried to assume power, but after some hesitation the military gave him a similar ultimatum. Congress was convened to select a successor, and on

June 5, to the surprise of many, elected Ramiro de Leon Carpio to serve out the remainder of Serrano's term.

The inauguration raised hopes of progress. De Leon was highly respected for his willingness to confront the military on human rights issues, and his ascension to power seemed to offer the prospect of real change. His replacement of both the incumbent defense minister and his immediate successor seemed to give substance to these hopes. Lacking organized party support, however, he soon came into conflict with the National Congress. In foreign affairs, a change of government in Belize helped revive Guatemala's long-standing territorial dispute with that nation. Human rights abuses continued, and de Leon's ability to control the military became suspect. Less than a month after his swearing in, newspaper publisher Jorge Carpio, who had finished second in the last two presidential elections, was murdered, raising the specter of revived political violence.

By last fall the situation was deteriorating rapidly. The president demanded that the National Congress resign and scheduled a national referendum to rally support for his position. In turn, legislators were threatening to initiate impeachment proceedings against de Leon. Pressures from the business community, the military, and, the nation's Catholic bishops helped break this deadlock. A package of constitutional reforms was worked out and submitted to a plebiscite this January. This compromise, however, neither resolved the nation's basic problems nor fully satisfied any faction. The package of reforms did little to change the basic dilemma confronting the nation. Guatemalans still had found no way to end decades of political violence, to provide a modicum of justice and economic opportunity for the country's indigenous majority, or to create an effective judicial system. The challenges facing the de Leon administration were formidable indeed.

NICARAGUA: DETERIORATION AND A NEW DAY?

Meanwhile the administration of President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro in Nicaragua was looking at an economy in which per capita gross domestic product had declined every year from 1985 through 1992, making its performance over the past decade the worst in the hemisphere. Estimates of unemployment ranged up to 50 percent. By most measures Nicaragua had become the poorest nation in Hispanic America.

As the economy floundered the political leadership engaged in incessant conflicts. The feud between the administration and Chamorro's own political coalition, the National Opposition Union (UNO), boiled over in late 1992 when the president sided with the Sandinistas and a small group of UNO congressmen known as the Center Group to oust the majority faction of the coalition from control of the National Assembly. The UNO majority responded by denouncing the admin-

istration and boycotting legislative sessions. They charged that the Chamorro administration, dominated by Minister of the Presidency Antonio Lacayo, had entered into a co-government arrangement with the Sandinistas, betraying the anti-Sandinista alliance that had won the 1990 elections. As the rhetoric escalated, disillusionment with the political process grew. By early last year, 85 percent of Nicaraguans indicated they were not interested in the fights between the various political factions. While 21 percent of Nicaraguans expressed support for the Sandinistas and 18 percent supported UNO, 61 percent declared they had no faith in any political party.

As the economy deteriorated and faith in the political system declined, more and more Nicaraguans resorted to violence. Armed groups of ex-contras, known as recontras, and Sandinista supporters, called recompas, clashed with government forces. In March, Nicaraguans demanding benefits for ex-contras and the removal of General Humberto Ortega as army commander occupied the Nicaraguan embassy in Costa Rica. That same month a Tripartite Commission, composed of representatives of the government, the Roman Catholic Church, and the International Support and Verification Commission of the OAS reported that there had been 627 political murders in the country under the Chamorro administration, more than 90 percent of which remained unsolved.

The situation deteriorated still further last May when a huge arsenal in Managua belonging to El Salvador's FMLN guerrillas was discovered after it exploded. This provided strong evidence of Sandinista support for insurgencies, and also of the inability of the Chamorro administration to control its own military. Investigation of the explosion uncovered additional arms caches belonging to Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas and evidence linking Sandinista officials with Basque terrorists, with plots to kidnap wealthy Latin Americans, and even with supplying passports for suspects in the February bombing of New York's World Trade Center began to emerge. United States assistance was suspended and the United States Congress threatened to enact economic sanctions unless Nicaragua could prove it was moving to curb terrorist activities.

While Nicaragua's international relations deteriorated, domestic violence mounted. In July the city of Estelí was occupied by ex-Sandinistas calling themselves the Revolutionary Front of Workers and Campesinos. They were eventually driven out by a major army assault that left more than 40 people dead. A few weeks later ex-contras took several Sandinista officials hostage and Sandinista backers responded by seizing much of the leadership of UNO, including the country's vice president, Virgilio Godoy. While a peaceful solution to this crisis was negotiated and the hostages were released unharmed, the nation appeared to be sliding toward anarchy.

In September the seemingly paralyzed government finally responded to mounting international and domestic pressure to do something about the increasingly chaotic situation. In a speech delivered during Army Day ceremonies, President Chamorro unexpectedly announced that she was removing Sandinista Lenin Cerna as head of intelligence and that she would replace Humberto Ortega as army commander in 1994. General Ortega and his brother, former Sandinista President Daniel Ortega, reacted to this announcement with angry defiance, vowing the general would remain in place until 1996. UNO supporters called for even quicker action and also demanded that Chamorro remove her son-in-law, Antonio Lacayo, from his powerful position as minister of the presidency. The Clinton administration welcomed Chamorro's announcement and released \$40 million in economic assistance, but made it clear that future aid appropriations would be greatly reduced.

The Ortegas' resistance to Chamorro's demands aggravated existing divisions among the Sandinistas. Prominent leaders, including the editor of the party newspaper, *Barricada*, openly called for Humberto Ortega's replacement and urged a dialogue with the governing coalition to resolve the political crisis. For a time it appeared the only result of such efforts would be a further fracturing of the Nicaraguan political scene, but by December real progress had been made. Stung by the prospect of losing control over their party, the Ortega brothers supported the talks. Despite opposition from the coalition's right wing, the bulk of UNO's congressional delegation, led by Christian Democrat Luis Humberto Guzman, worked out an agreement with the Sandinistas and the Center Group on a sweeping package of constitutional reforms that would curb presidential powers and make possible some degree of congressional control over the military. Tensions and distrust remained high, but as 1993 drew to a close Nicaragua's feuding politicians at last seemed to taking some hesitant steps to keep their battered nation from economic and political collapse.

BUILDING THE FUTURE

At the start of 1994 Central America had begun to deal with the bitter heritage of more than a decade of violent conflicts. Freed from the pressures generated by cold war conflicts, the region's leaders were increasingly turning their attention to long neglected domestic problems. But as the events of 1993 had so clearly demonstrated, the damage done during the 1980s would be much more difficult to repair than it had been to wreak. Central Americans face mammoth obstacles with severely limited resources and likely continued decline in external assistance. But while the future is threatening and uncertain, there is now general consensus that the most disastrous of all courses would be a return to the patterns of the past. ■

"As authoritarian governments fell, the ideological consensus built on protecting the church's authority from the military's crude attacks was reduced. Democratic developments have left a number of national churches with the difficult task of redefining what it means to serve as 'the voice of the voiceless' in countries that now permit legal political parties [and] trade unions. . . to represent the interests of society before the state giving voters choices between opposing political, economic, social, and even moral agendas."

Church and State in Latin America

BY HANNAH STEWART-GAMBINO

In the past two decades in Latin America, religious stereotypes with deep roots in broad historical truths have been dashed. Latin America is no longer considered a "Catholic continent" in which national churches align themselves with the interests and political projects of wealthy elites or the urban middle class. Instead of the Roman Catholic Church's gradual relegation to the private sphere, national churches continue to play a crucial, sometimes central, role in Latin American politics. At the same time, Protestant churches, which historically did not appeal to indigenous peoples, have experienced explosive growth. Latin American religious life is in the midst of tumultuous change.

FAULTLINES IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Beginning in the 1960s, the once conservative Catholic Church began to change in response to events and developments within the church as well as to the domestic politics of individual countries. Bishops engaged in new theological debates over the proper role of the church in Latin America, inspired in part by the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), convened by Pope John XXIII to help make the church more relevant to modern men and women. In 1968, at the first meeting of the Latin American Bishops Conference after Vatican II, the bishops adopted Vatican II's framework of "see, judge, act" as a new approach for theological discussion focused on clarifying the needs of the modern world.

In order to more accurately "see" Latin American reality, the bishops sought the assistance of social

scientists identified with neoimperialist interpretations of third world underdevelopment. According to this school of thought, the economic, political, and social ills of twentieth-century Latin America must be understood as the legacy of 500 years of exploitative relationships, first with colonial powers and more recently with the economically imperialist first world countries (notably the United States) and their multinational corporations. With this in mind, progressive Latin American bishops affirmed a "theology of liberation" that explicitly rejected the church's historical alliance with elites and repressive governments and declared the church's "preferential option for the poor."

Liberation theology is based on a commitment to looking at the Gospel through the lens of the poor, a viewpoint reinforced during the 1960s by increasingly radicalized priests involved in worker-priest projects in poor neighborhoods. At the same time, rightist and leftist movements polarized throughout Latin America, followed in the 1960s and 1970s by a wave of military coups. These larger political developments tended to confirm the convictions of church progressives who called for clear demonstrations of the church's solidarity with the victims of state-sponsored human rights abuses and economic austerity policies.

During the 1970s and early 1980s economic conditions for the majority of Latin Americans deteriorated, due in part to crushing national debts run up by military regimes. Human rights abuses by military and paramilitary forces escalated, with priests, nuns, and lay workers among the victims. Under these circumstances, dissension within the church tended to be muted. Traditionalists, who saw the church's identification with the poor (including those targeted by government security forces as members of the opposition) as excessively politicized and contrary to the church's universal mission to save souls, also viewed state-sponsored attacks on progressive religious personnel as intolerable assaults on the church's institutional integrity. Thus, in spite of great strain between tradition-

HANNAH STEWART-GAMBINO is an assistant professor of political science at Lehigh University. She is the author of *The Church and Politics in the Chilean Countryside* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992) and coeditor with Edward Cleary of *Conflict and Competition: The Latin American Church in a Changing Environment* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Press, 1992).

alists and progressives, Latin American church hierarchies generally presented a united opposition to what was generally perceived as the illegitimate use of force by abusive regimes.

But faultlines within the church remained deep. The democratic wave of the last decade has revealed tensions within the church that run vertically, dividing bishops against bishops, and horizontally, dividing priests against bishops and bishops against the Vatican. As authoritarian governments fell, the ideological consensus built on protecting the church's authority from the military's crude attacks was reduced. Democratic developments have left a number of national churches with the difficult task of redefining what it means to serve as "the voice of the voiceless" in countries that now permit legal political parties, trade unions, and other more traditionally "political" institutions to represent the interests of society before the state, giving voters choices between opposing political, economic, social, and even moral agendas.

More difficult still, church elites who were united in their opposition to repressive regimes are often divided over the wisdom or appropriateness of publicly condemning democratically elected governments' social or economic policies. In "fragile" or "transitional" democracies from Guatemala to Chile, the military continues to exercise inordinate political power, even the ability to veto elected officials' decisions. In such cases national churches have to weigh the desire to denounce policies that continue to marginalize or simply exclude the poor against the desire to support democratic governments living with the constant threat of military intervention. These concerns can strain relations between progressive priests, especially those involved in grassroots work with the poor, and their bishops who want to withdraw the church from the oppositional stance it took during previous regimes to a less "political," more traditionally pastoral, role in democratic states.

STRUGGLES WITH THE VATICAN

Cutting across these divisions is the post-Vatican II struggle to define the nature of authority in the church. The innovations resulting from Vatican II (for example, greater collegiality between priests and bishops, the translation of the Mass into the vernacular, an increased role for the laity in the church's pastoral life, and an emphasis on worldly socioeconomic and political concerns) have led to challenges in the developed as well as the developing world to the traditionally hierarchical authority patterns of the church. At issue is whether the church is defined primarily as "the people of God" or as an institution whose longevity can be attributed to its adherence to hierarchy and orthodoxy. Progressives, already committed to a more activist vision, find legitimation for their community involvement in their reading of the Gospel and in the shared

experiences of committed Christians in popular organizations. Traditionalists believe authority and the moral and social guidelines for the church flow primarily from the Vatican down through the various levels of the international church.

Arguments over the nature and distribution of authority in the church are hardly arcane. Pope John Paul II, deeply committed to reversing many post-Vatican II trends, fills vacancies with traditionalists loyal to the old model of papal authority. The practical implications for millions of the faithful as well as for the role of the church throughout Latin America are immense. The church has been most prophetic in championing the interests of the dispossessed in those dioceses where the bishop has taken a strong liberationist stance. Bishops who persistently call for social justice in their public statements affect the terms of national debate in ways that can influence government policymaking. But perhaps more important, liberationist bishops adhere to the Latin American church's post-Medellín commitment to reach out to the poor through base Christian communities—small, grassroots religious organizations that meet to explore the meaning of the biblical message in their lives. Priests and nuns as well as lay workers have been given a great deal of flexibility in their organizational efforts by progressive bishops. Some of the base communities, inspired by their own interpretations of the Gospel, have taken on activist, and sometimes overtly political, projects.

John Paul II and the Vatican bureaucracy, however, fear that if the base Christian communities and other grassroots organizations are not tied closely to the hierarchy and prohibited from engaging in any nonpastoral or "political" activities, Catholic doctrinal orthodoxy will be weakened and the church will become analogous to any other national or local interest group. If the church becomes too closely identified with activist projects or political agendas, their thinking goes, then the church's fortunes can rise and fall with changing political realities, seriously jeopardizing the church's stability and, consequently, its universal mission. In 1989, in order to rein in internationally renowned progressive Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns of São Paulo, the Vatican carved out four new dioceses from the poorer, peripheral areas of the city and appointed conservative bishops to lead them. The effect was dramatic. According to one pastoral agent in the new São Miguel diocese, "The regional administration of the city used to listen to the voice of the church. Today, the popular movements have to negotiate individually with the administration. . . . The institutional church has abandoned the people in their misery." In the words of another: "The division cut off the arms and legs of the church. We lost our strength."

The Vatican's assault on progressives has included ideological attacks as well. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger,

the traditionalist hard-liner who heads the Vatican's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (the bureaucracy charged with maintaining orthodoxy), has waged a running battle with liberation theologians, most notably Brazil's Leonardo Boff and Peru's Gustavo Gutierrez. In 1984 the cardinal accused Boff, the theologian who most clearly elucidated the progressive church's commitment to base Christian communities, of using Christianity as a vehicle for Marxist beliefs. After being called to Rome to defend his "challenge" to the institutional authority of the church and enduring an official one-year ban of silence and continued tensions with the conservative Roman curia, Boff left the priesthood.

Boff's is the most celebrated of cases; however, all the Latin American churches have felt the Vatican's pressure. The promotion of traditionalists has put an end to the teaching of liberationist courses in seminaries, which will affect future generations of priests and religious. The Vatican also appoints conservative papal nuncios to foreign countries, including those in Latin America. As the Vatican's eyes and ears, these men shape the information and interpretations of events in host countries funneled to Rome, and can exercise a great deal of influence on national hierarchies and individual bishops. For example, in Mexico conservative Papal Nuncio Girolamo Prigione recently initiated proceedings to remove from office Bishop Samuel Ruiz, a well-known champion of the poor and indigenous people in his largely Mayan southern diocese of Chiapas, after years of accusing Ruiz of Marxist leanings and theological "errors." However, the peasant uprising in Chiapas in January has complicated matters. Peasant leaders have stipulated that they want Bishop Ruiz to serve as their mediator in talks with the government. The pope clearly supports the church's role as an international mediator—a role it successfully played in Latin America in the early 1980s when it helped resolve the border dispute between Argentina and Chile. Yet if Ruiz is successful in mediating the Chiapas conflict, then the Vatican will have to publicly support the very bishop who was under Vatican investigation for challenging Vatican authority and committing theological "errors."

Vatican decisions also affect women and lay leaders who have not seen their position in institutional religious life enhanced. During the harshest years of state-sponsored violence, lay people and religious women's valiant organizational work saved many lives. But in areas where previous bishops encouraged, or repressive conditions forced, greater autonomy that permitted lay and women leaders to meet considerable ecclesial needs, progressive trends often have been

reversed with the reassertion of the institutional church's control.

Religious traditionalists do not necessarily support "conservative" or reactionary political movements or positions. However, the practical, political effect of traditionalists' attacks on progressives is the appearance of tacit support for the status quo, which in most cases continues to involve domination by right-wing or military elements, particularly in Central America. Sometimes, as in the case of Archbishop Oscar Romero who was assassinated by paramilitary forces in El Salvador in 1980, attacks on the church can push traditionalists toward a radicalizing awareness of the plight of the poor. Yet quite a few church elites are both religious traditionalists and political conservatives.

Another source of tension between progressives and traditionalists arose with the 1992 quincentenary of the "discovery" of the Americas. In anticipation of the celebration of 500 years of Catholic influence in the New World, John Paul II announced as early as 1983 a "new evangelization" in Latin America—by which he meant a drive to attract the masses to adherence to the traditional church. When the Conference of Latin American Religious, which represents more than 355,000 men and women from religious orders and congregations, unveiled its "Word-Life" program, a catechetical project based on the notion that "evangelization should start with the word of God as experienced by the Latin American people themselves," traditionalist Latin American bishops denounced the series as "ideological." In 1989 the Vatican instructed the group to withdraw Word-Life, with the reminder that "the bishops are the teachers of faith and truth." These and other clashes with the Vatican have had a chilling effect on those religious and lay workers whose interpretation of the church's preferential option for the poor requires community activism and defense of the temporal interests of the poor. For these progressives, "the distance between those who see a connection between faith and life, and those who separate faith and life, has grown in a frightening way."¹

However, neither the Vatican nor traditionalist clerics can ignore the realities of persistent poverty in Latin America. Moreover, the church cannot rest complacently on the assumption that the 90 percent of the population that calls itself "Catholic" will not be lost to the aggressively recruiting Protestant, particularly Pentecostal, sects. Nor can churches assume that Catholics consider the church's moral or pastoral—much less social or political—pronouncements binding. This is especially true in Latin America, home to 45 percent of the world's Catholics. Thus traditionalists often appropriate progressive symbols and language in pursuit of traditionalist aims. For example, John Paul II directed much of his opening speech to the bishops at the most recent CELAM meeting in October 1992 in Santo Domingo to demonstrating his

¹Cathy Rowan and Joanne Blaney, "Brazilian Church Caught in Vatican Squeeze," *Latinamerica Press*, October 21, 1993.

awareness of the poor. John Paul II's traditionalist use of liberationist language is best explained by journalist Penny Lernoux, who calls John Paul II a "populist integralist". "John Paul, who thinks in terms of peoples—not nation states—is deeply supportive of the populism that enables a people to express political, economic, or social aspirations through religious gestures and symbols. . . [Yet] John Paul's Catholicism has a clear set of rules and it is the responsibility of priests to make sure that they are obeyed."²

Traditionalists and the conservative Roman curia, after failing to definitively defeat liberationists at the third Latin American Bishops Conference (CELAM) meeting in Puebla, Mexico, in 1979, arrived for the fourth conference, in Santo Domingo in 1992, with a strengthened hand. The national bishops conferences (where progressives' voices are more likely to be heard) had rejected two working documents prepared by the conservative-dominated CELAM between 1990 and 1992. In response, the Vatican changed the leadership structure and appointed Vatican Secretary of State Angelo Sodano (the conservative, pro-Pinochet papal nuncio to Chile during Augusto Pinochet's military dictatorship) as an additional president of the Santo Domingo meeting. After the more moderate Brazilian Bishop Raymundo Damasceno Assis took the reins at CELAM in 1991, the Vatican announced a third co-presider over the Santo Domingo meeting, Chilean Bishop Jorge Medina, a protégé of Cardinal Sodano and a vocal supporter of the military regime with close ties to General Pinochet. While serving as papal nuncio, Sodano attempted to have Medina, who is widely disliked in Chile, promoted to archbishop of Santiago, a move opponents blocked by persuading the Vatican it would irreparably split the Chilean church. But consistent with recent Vatican appointments, Medino was later named to head the Valparaíso diocese.

In addition to imposing conservative leaders on the Santo Domingo meeting, the Vatican attempted to change the "see, judge, act" format for theological reflection. Instead of beginning with an examination of Latin American reality (where exploitation and oppression, progressives argue, force a temporal as well as spiritual interpretation of the church's preferential option for the poor), the Santo Domingo meeting began with lectures by four Vatican-approved theologians who laid out academic starting points for discussion. Yet in spite of all the machinations, Latin American progressives, most vocally represented by the Brazilian bishops but including strong voices from throughout Central and South American churches, successfully organized a last-minute effort to redraft significant portions of the meeting's final document. The result is a compromise called *New Evangelization*,

Human Development, Christian Culture. Traditionalists' efforts are most apparent in the abstract language calling for a renewed drive to win Latin Americans back to the church; in these sections "new evangelization" is intended to indicate a return to more strictly defined pastoral work. On the other hand, liberationists' influence shines through in sections concerning inculturation and human promotion in which the bishops reaffirm their preferential option for the poor. Using the "see, judge, act" methodology, these sections include reflections on the church's role in resolving crises in ecology, urbanization, race relations, economic justice, human rights, and women's issues.

THE EXPLOSION OF NON-CATHOLIC SECTS

John Paul II, opening the Santo Domingo meetings, warned Latin American bishops to defend the faithful from the "rapacious wolves" of Protestant sects that "caus[e] division and discord in our communities." The pope's strong language dealt a blow to 20 years of ecumenical efforts; however, he reflected a concern among Latin American traditionalists and progressives alike, who view the unprecedented conversion rates to Protestant, particularly Pentecostal, churches as a serious threat to the Catholic Church. So-called mainline Protestant churches (those with their roots in the European Protestant Reformation) have sent missionaries to Latin America since the end of the nineteenth century without much success, yet in the past several decades membership has exploded. These groups include a wide variety of religious belief structures, ranging from historical Protestant and Pentecostal churches to Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Assemblies of God, syncretist sects such as Afro-Brazilian cults, and other groups.

Pentecostal churches account for as much as 75 to 90 percent of new non-Catholic membership. Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala, with a non-Catholic population estimated at at least 20 percent, have been centers of Pentecostal growth. Pentecostals take their name from Pentecost, the descentance of the Holy Spirit on the apostles described in the Book of Acts, that inspired the apostles to speak in "tongues of fire" and preach in unknown languages. Visible signs of conversion and faith, such as speaking in tongues, faith healing, and prophesying, are central features of Pentecostalism. Since authority in Pentecostal belief is a gift from the Holy Spirit that is accessible to any true believer, new groups readily spring up around charismatic leaders. There is no one "Pentecostal church," but rather a myriad of groups ranging from well-established churches such as Brazil's Universal Church of the Kingdom of God with its \$45-million television studio in São Paulo and 14 radio stations to tiny storefront groups dotting every Latin American city. Observers of Latin American Pentecostalism have divided Pentecostal groups into three varieties: "linked" groups, funded and directed by United States churches; fundamental-

²Penny Lernoux, *People of God: The Struggle for World Catholicism* (New York: Penguin Books, 1989).

ist groups, which are largely separationist and staunchly adhere to a literal interpretation of biblical “fundamentals”; and indigenous groups with roots in Latin America dating back, for example, to the turn of the century in Chile and Brazil and the 1920s in other countries.

Millions of dollars have flowed from United States churches to linked churches in Latin America. Evidence suggests that during the 1980s the United States government funneled resources through an intricate network of wealthy right-wing supporters, American churches, and Latin American religious satellites in an effort to build pro-United States sentiment and combat the influence of progressive, liberationist Catholics, particularly in Central America during the height of the United States military and covert involvement in regional struggles.³

It is a mistake, however, to attribute Pentecostals' conversion rates to United States manipulation alone. Persistent economic and social deterioration often results in massive internal migration to cities and significant refugee populations, conditions under which traditional bonds of family and faith break down; Pentecostalism is a dynamic and vibrant faith in which the visible signs of salvation are at once reassuring and cathartic for believers, as is the involvement of preachers from backgrounds similar to their own, using easily understood local idioms, indigenous musical forms, and local customs. In addition, the centrality of personal salvation and the leading of a righteous life lend a sense of control and hope to many in a chaotic and hostile world, and the shared injunction to proselytize and win new converts as a sign of one's faith has deep appeal. It is relatively easy to attain to positions of authority and esteem, in contrast to the years of training and celibacy required for leadership in the Catholic Church, and places for worship and people to serve at them are readily available in areas chronically starved for Catholic priests. Visits to Latin America by renowned preachers such as Jimmy Swaggert, whose televised addresses and stadium appearances regularly draw hundreds of thousands of viewers, also contribute to Pentecostal success. Considering that an estimated 15 percent of people who identify themselves as Catholics attend Mass or regularly participate in the practice of their religion, it appears that the number of active Catholics and active Protestants are roughly equal. The consequences of such a dramatic change in the “Catholic continent” are potentially far-reaching, and only partially understood.

Non-Catholics are only beginning to make their political presence known, in part because their organi-

zational efforts have been directed toward winning converts or dissipated through endless schisms. The conventional wisdom is that Pentecostals and other evangelicals are either inherently apolitical, eschewing worldly associations in favor of religious group identity and concentration on personal salvation, or politically conservative in ways consistent with their fundamentalist beliefs. This characterization is largely true, but not necessarily so: the non-Catholic vote was a significant factor in former Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano's election in 1991 and Alberto Fujimori's victory in Peru. But more important for the future, although the larger or linked Pentecostal churches are usually grounded in conservative ideological positions, little in Pentecostal theology foreordains a particular political viewpoint. Inward-focused, second- and third-generation churches may find over time that they are forced to take positions on local or even national issues that affect the faithful.

NO FOREGONE CONCLUSIONS

Old stereotypes no longer hold true, yet no new fixed characterizations are possible during this period of rapid religious change. As observers now tell us, Latin American Catholic progressives were never as numerous or as powerful as was thought in the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, in spite of Catholic traditionalists' sustained efforts to dismantle progressives' theological foundations and organizational structures, priests, bishops, lay leaders, and women religious continue to speak and act with prophetic voices throughout Latin America. Some national churches—for example, in Bolivia, Venezuela, and Guatemala—are taking increasingly courageous stands on the behalf of the poor and marginalized. And despite the Vatican's successes in changing the political complexion of bishops councils in countries like Chile and Brazil, these national hierarchies show signs of retaining their commitment to speak out on issues of economic injustice and human rights. In the meantime, the challenge from non-Catholic groups has led to a religious dynamism that has revitalized the faith of millions of Latin Americans, either through conversion or a return to Catholicism through Catholic charismatic movements. The political implications of this religious ferment, especially for emergent democratic trends, are impossible to foretell. Will the widespread, grassroots organizational work accomplished through religious networks, particularly under regimes that have heavily repressed political mobilization, buttress fragile democratic institutions? Does religious organization strengthen participation in the associations of civil society? Will newly organized religious groups enter the political arena in any systematic way? Religion and politics have always been closely linked in Latin America; it remains to be seen how this complex relationship evolves in the future. ■

³See David Stoll, *Is Latin America Turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) and David Martin, *Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America* (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1990).

"Colombia now enjoys one of the healthiest and most flourishing economies in Latin America. And in political terms its democratic structures, notwithstanding inevitable flaws, are among the most solid on the continent."

Colombia: Democracy, Development, and Drugs

BY JOHN D. MARTZ

On December 2, 1993, Pablo Escobar, onetime boss of the Medellín drug cartel, was killed in a shootout with Colombian police. Although large crowds tearfully recalled him as a modern-day Robin Hood at his funeral a few days later, Escobar's death provided scant consolation for the thousands whose lives, either directly or indirectly, had been destroyed by his actions. At the same time, his demise did not mark an end to Colombia's thriving drug industry or significantly interrupt the violence that continues to be visited on the Colombian populace.

Escobar's death understandably made national and international headlines. However, widespread perceptions of Colombia as a nation riddled by drug-related crime and a theater of unending combat with guerrillas grossly distort reality. It is no less important to recognize that Colombia now enjoys one of the healthiest and most flourishing economies in Latin America. And in political terms its democratic structures, notwithstanding inevitable flaws, are among the most solid on the continent.

A WAR WITHOUT END?

Pablo Escobar's dramatic death, although closing the book on a notorious criminal, was but one more event in the ongoing drug war. The government, embarrassed by Escobar's almost casual escape from luxurious prison lodgings in the summer of 1992, organized a special force known as the Bloque de Búsqueda to track down Escobar. While its primary responsibility was the capture or killing of the drug lord, the Bloque was also assigned the task of eliminating what remained of the Medellín cartel.

The Bloque frequently carried out sweeping searches and arrests against the deteriorating remnants of his organization. There were at least 3,000 such operations, including a massive mobilization on October 13 that encircled Medellín. Despite many frustrations,

government forces captured a number of Escobar's confidants; others were killed in the months before his death. All this was somehow appropriate for the publicity-conscious Medellín organization, which cherished its carefully polished image as benefactors of the poor.

The government also put less violent methods into play. President César Gaviria recognized that the drug cartel based in Cali ultimately represented a far more serious challenge. Quiet and understated in contrast to Escobar and his Medellín colleagues, these narco-traffickers had worked assiduously to establish their local credentials; they became business entrepreneurs who moved within accepted boundaries, keeping drug-related activities in the background. While eschewing the spotlight, they had progressively inserted themselves into civic and managerial circles.

Government officials such as Gustavo de Greiff, the embattled public prosecutor, are trying to persuade Cali drug dealers to turn themselves in. The avowed leniency of President Gaviria's approach has lent itself to negotiations. Lawyers for leading Cali figures such as Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela and others profess themselves sincere in wanting to work out the means to surrender to the authorities.

On September 25 the Cali prosecutor actually issued an arrest warrant against Gilberto's brother Miguel. By early November, however, charges against him and four other alleged cartel bosses were dropped for lack of evidence. A series of leaks by Colombian police and prosecutorial officials clouded the situation. There were also allegations that the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) had not provided evidence that had been promised. In truth, the low-key operational style and sophisticated machinery developed by the Cali drug traffickers makes prosecution difficult. Prospects for the government to challenge, let alone seriously curb the Cali-based drug activities, remain grim, shadowed by what is at stake—for 1993 drug profits in Colombia were estimated, at the very least, between \$20 billion and \$25 billion.

Legalization, at least on a selective basis, continues to be a topic for debate. Specifically, the respected

JOHN D. MARTZ is the author or editor of 18 books on Latin America. His current research concentrates on the comparative political analysis of Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Since 1989 he has served as editor of the journal *Studies in Comparative International Development*.

de Greiff has questioned the impact of the war on drugs. In October he floated the notion of legalization. During a December visit to Washington his views were set forth in more uncompromising terms, to the dismay of United States Attorney General Janet Reno and officials from the diplomatic and intelligence communities. While the Gaviria government officially disavowed these views, there is growing skepticism in Colombia over whether the drug war can be won. Notwithstanding such headline-gripping events as Escobar's death, the drug war in its present form is far from over.

THE GUERRILLA THREAT

Narcotrafficking is by no means the only threat to public security and individual freedom. Guerrilla activity, while less extensive than in the past, still constitutes a serious challenge. Attacks on oil pipelines inflicted serious economic damage. To counter the guerrillas, César Gaviria initiated a campaign to destroy or at least neutralize guerrilla forces by offering them reentry into the Colombian political system.

After many failed attempts at reaching negotiated agreements, Gaviria suspended peace talks in November 1992. This led to an increasing number of kidnappings as well as attacks on the oil pipeline in northeastern Colombia. The government increased the military budget by \$220 million and further upgraded counterinsurgency efforts. Last April the defense minister proclaimed certain victory over the guerrillas in the next 18 months, citing facts such as an improved soldier-guerrilla casualty toll. Few, however, found his arguments persuasive.

Notwithstanding pressures from Colombian security forces and a reinvigorated antiguerrilla campaign by the armed forces, rebellious hard-liners resisted further negotiation with government authorities. The Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera Simón Bolívar (CNGSB), composed of representatives from a host of guerrilla organizations, questioned the government's sincerity, citing a number of alleged assaults. The rebels continued to give little quarter, engaging in a variety of terrorist acts, from sabotage and abduction to murder. A typical episode occurred on August 28 when 13 outnumbered police were killed by guerrilla forces in Sumapaz.

This presaged a higher level of violence soon launched by the so-called Black September offensive. Members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) set off bombs in Bogotá, attacked small military units at selected Caribbean outposts, and engaged in a new round of kidnappings. Among the more notable victims of the last was the head of the huge Ardila Lülle industrial conglomerate. At the same time, the killing of negotiators from other small guerrilla groups further derailed government efforts at pacification.

Official efforts to revive the dialogue were further dampened in October when a hard-line faction of the ELN rejected a proposed resumption of talks. By year's end the campaign headquarters of several presidential candidates had been bombed, and threats against local officials were commonplace.

The general climate was further clouded by the murder on November 7 of Dario Londoño, the Liberal party vice president in the senate. Although both guerrillas and drug traffickers were suspected, the killing encouraged further restrictions on public appearances by major political leaders. The guerrillas were also responsible for serious economic damage as they intensified their attacks on the Caño Limón–Puerto Covenas petroleum pipeline. In March 1993 the government conceded that an estimated \$3 billion in oil revenues had been lost during the preceding 12 months.

There was ample evidence that the rebels were largely unconcerned with ideology or programmatic policy issues. The primary motivation was material; they were flourishing with the benefits gained by robberies, kidnappings, bribery, and under-the-table deals with members of Colombia's economic elite. The government was thus left with limited leverage, other than a continuing military campaign.

THE ECONOMIC LEDGER

Despite a variety of problems, the economy has enjoyed an extended period of growth. In 1992 the gross domestic product grew nearly 3.6 percent. Foreign reserves rose by \$13 billion, and growing trade liberalization stimulated an increase in private investment of 50 percent. Inflation, however, remained a problem, although it dropped slightly to 25.2 percent. The Gaviria government undertook a renewed attack to reduce the rate in early 1993. Price increases were decreed for petroleum and electricity, water, and telephone services. Resisting pressures from labor and popular demands for a significant increase in social services, the administration staunchly stood by its liberalization approach to enhance the economy.

A major policy initiative came in April 1993 with the government's announcement of plans to accelerate privatization. Holdings worth an estimated \$2.5 billion were to be sold off by the end of the presidential term this August; the revenue generated would be used to underwrite social welfare measures and new infrastructure projects. Many state employees, notably those in the telecommunications industry, were sharply critical of the proposal. More than 50,000 employees were to be dismissed during the course of privatization, a figure that raised the hackles of organized labor but ultimately spared the government widespread protests.

Statistics for the first half of 1993 showed growth at 4.8 percent above the same period in 1992, and later estimates ran as high as 5 percent for 1993. Mining and

construction, along with financial and public services, increased by some 9 and 10 percent. Industry also expanded by roughly 5 percent despite the competition of imports. Furthermore, by mid-October foreign equity investment was more than double that for 1992. Nonoil foreign investment for the year promised to exceed that for 1992, which itself had set a record. Meanwhile, the petroleum industry looked extremely promising. This reflected in no small part the magnitude of new finds in the huge Cusiana oilfields.

Thanks to Cusiana, estimates of proven reserves were a minimum of 2 billion barrels by mid-1993—a virtual doubling of both Colombia's petroleum holdings and export revenues. Within four years the exports of crude from the rich Cusiana oilfields should reach some 600,000 barrels per day—three times the present level: Colombia can expect to become the second-largest oil producer in Latin America after Venezuela. Earnings could well approach \$4 billion per year, or 50 percent of the nation's present exports. Growth in GDP by 1997 may well exceed 5 percent as a consequence. In July, the government reached an agreement with British Petroleum and others to develop the fields in conjunction with ECOPETROL, the state petroleum corporation. Prospects glowed even more brightly a month later with the discovery of additional reserves that should add another 100,000 barrels to Colombia's daily production.

The rosy growth picture, however, raised concerns about the overheating of the economy. Mindful of the Mexican mishandling of major petroleum discoveries in the early 1980s, the finance minister declared in August that the government would use a significant portion of the new petroleum-generated income to reduce the foreign debt and that foreign borrowing would be cut back. The distribution of royalties soon became a congressional concern, and there was discussion about creating a fund that might assure the withholding of excess resources from the domestic economy and thus control the potential for overheating the economy.

At the same time, the government proposed an expansionary 1994 budget of \$19.2 billion, some 5 percent higher than 1993. While an estimated \$2.1-billion shortfall would presumably be covered by existing international credit lines, 1994 expenditures could also allow for a sharp increase in social spending and infrastructure projects that might influence the electorate. On a similar note, the government effectively moved public investment earmarked for politically productive housing and developmental construction projects from 29 percent (in 1990) to 41 percent.

On the trade front, the immediate impact of accelerating liberalization stimulated a dramatic increase in the import of luxury goods, which produced a widening trade gap. The long range outlook for trade was,

however, favorable. The signing by César Gaviria and Venezuela's President Carlos Andrés Pérez of a free trade accord, for example, solidified economic relations between the two nations. This was further enhanced by a series of agreements negotiated between the two governments. The creation of a virtual customs union led to an increase in trade of 200 percent since 1989—a far more dramatic expansion than either nation had anticipated.

At the end of October, Colombia signed a trade agreement with Venezuela and Mexico. The agreement, which became effective this January, commits the three countries to eliminate all trade tariffs during the next 20 years. Colombia also negotiated a free trade agreement with Chile in November, while working for a companion understanding with the nations of Central America. The renaissance and revitalization of the Andean Pact also remained on the government's economic agenda.

THE 1994 ELECTORAL FIELD

As the Gaviria administration moved into its final year, attention predictably turned to the forthcoming elections to be held this March and May. With the president constitutionally prohibited from serving another term, the political competition had grown increasingly intense by the closing months of 1993. The three most likely candidates appear to be Ernesto Samper Pizano for the Liberals, Andrés Pastrana Arango for the Conservatives, and Antonio Navarro Wolff for the Democratic Alliance/M-19.

For the Liberals, who have been the dominant party for some four decades, the struggle for the presidential nomination has been especially fierce. Moreover, the disunity and weakness of its national directorate forced the party to recall septugenarian former president Julio César Turbay Ayala as its national chief. It became his task to mediate between and among the several rival camps, to bury political and ideological divisions, and to keep open channels of communication between the party and the Gaviria administration.

The evident frontrunner, who had been a serious challenger for the party nomination four years earlier, was Ernesto Samper Pizano. Having returned recently from a stint as ambassador to Spain, Samper had emerged from a reformist past as a young maverick to the image of an establishment leader, and had been generally viewed as the probable Liberal candidate and eventual successor to Gaviria. At the same time, his opposition included such nationally prominent and powerful figures as Humberto de la Calle, Carlos Lemos Simmonds, and Enrique Parejo. The first had been Gaviria's minister of government for much of the term; Lemos and Parejo were veteran politicians who had held a variety of responsible positions through the years.

For Julio César Turbay Ayala, it was crucial to secure

internal party agreement over the procedural rules of the game. In 1990 the Liberals had agreed that the March congressional elections would also serve in effect as a presidential primary that would produce the Liberal candidate for the May race. Turbay sought with considerable difficulty to negotiate a similar agreement among the 1994 candidates. Lemos and Parejo in particular feared that holding a Liberal primary in conjunction with March congressional elections would most benefit candidates with strong political machines. They were also sharp critics of the Liberal government, which complicated government-party relations. Not until late in 1993 was Turbay eventually able to secure acceptance of the primary by all the aspiring Liberal candidates.

The picture for the Conservatives was different, although as complicated as that of the Liberals. Andrés Pastrana, a popular former mayor of Bogotá and son of ex-president Misael Pastrana Borrero, had earlier organized his own New Democratic Force (NFD). In 1992 he had reached an accord with President Gaviria that assured NFD representation in the cabinet; in exchange Pastrana provided his general if less than automatic support for government policies.

Running strongly in the polls, Pastrana stayed aloof from the internal politics of the Conservative party, served as a visible if less than distinguished senator, and refused to announce his candidacy. This stance has been coming under increasing criticism, but for the moment has served him well in remaining outside daily partisan squabbling. Meanwhile, a number of prominent Conservative hopefuls were seeking the regular party nomination, including among others Rodrigo Llorente, Roberto Gerlein, Juan Diego Jaramillo, and Gabriel Melo.

Waiting in the wings is Alvaro Gómez Hurtado, another son of a former president; Gómez had twice been the Conservative candidate before running a third time in 1990 as head of his Movement of National Salvation (MSN). A 40-year rivalry inside the Conservatives, embodied for the past two decades by the conflict between Misael Pastrana and Alvaro Gómez, raised the possibility that the latter would again launch his own candidacy. This constituted a major threat to the cohort of Conservative candidates while also complicating matters for Pastrana.

In 1990 Alvaro Gómez had humiliated Misael Pastrana's candidate in the presidential elections, and he was by no means reconciled to the Conservative candidacy of another member of the Pastrana family. Promising a "surprise" announcement for March in conjunction with the congressional elections, Gómez thereby cast a shadow on the prospects for Andrés Pastrana as well as several rival Conservative aspirants.

Besides the two eventual Liberal and Conservative contenders, a third certain candidate was Antonio Navarro of the Democratic Alliance/M-19. Having inherited the party's leadership following the killing of its presumed presidential candidate in 1990, Navarro has become its dominant figure. Navarro had run third in the 1990 presidential race with nearly 13 percent of the vote—an all-time high for the Colombian left. Navarro proceeded to lead the former guerrilla organization to respectability in the subsequent Constituent Assembly, where Navarro was one of the key leaders. M-19 was active in the Congress that followed.

M-19 had negotiated an agreement with Gaviria, who came to office voicing a desire for a government coalition reaching beyond the several Liberal factions. First Navarro and later another party member served as minister of health. For a time Navarro even led in the polls for possible successors to Gaviria in 1990. Despite a gradual decline in popularity as he entered the political mainstream, Navarro remained an attractive campaigner. While recognizing that he would not win the presidency, he has sought to produce a strong M-19 showing that might give it legislative clout in Congress, perhaps tilting the balance on issues critical to the incoming administration.

A LOOK AHEAD

Electoral campaigning and politicking assure strong partisan activity this year. While political events might alter the plot, the probable victor in the presidential races will be Ernesto Samper. If so, Andrés Pastrana can bide his time for another four years. But whatever the outcome this March and May, there is little reason to anticipate major changes in the policy guidelines laid down by the Gaviria government. Reforms or revisions will generally be slow and gradual, with Colombia maintaining its economic health.

Relations with the United States will be generally proper, but not without problems. Collaboration in the drug war will continue to complicate matters, as was true when Gustavo de Greiff advocated legalizing drugs during his recent visit to Washington. The projected deployment of United States troops near Cali has also produced nationalistic outcries of protest. Announced in late December, the deployment called for North Americans to build a road, hospital, and school some 45 miles from Cali. Local Colombian officials as well as congressmen denounced the move, although the invitation had been issued by President Gaviria.

These reminders of anti-Yankee sentiment reflected historic suspicion over the motives of the United States. Yet they are unlikely to serve as a deterrent to continuing economic growth, or to disrupt Colombia's well-established political stability. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

ON LATIN AMERICA

I, Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian Woman in Guatemala

By Rigoberta Menchú. London: Verso, 1992. 251 pp., \$16.95.

Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation

By the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation. Phillip E. Berryman, trans. Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1993. 2 volumes, 907 pp., \$59.95 cloth; \$29.95 paper.

El Salvador's Decade of Terror: Human Rights since the Assassination of Archbishop Romero

By Americas Watch. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994. 207 pp., \$15.00.

Death Foretold:

The Jesuit Murders in El Salvador

By Martha Doggett. Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 1993. 358 pp., \$40.00 cloth; \$19.95 paper.

Since the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international organizations like the UN, Amnesty International, and Americas Watch have championed the rights of prisoners of conscience detained, physically or mentally tortured, or killed because of their ethnicity, religion, or political beliefs. The four publications under review explore the phenomenon of the organized violation of human rights in Latin America from vastly different points of view.

Rigoberta Menchú's 1984 autobiography, *I, Rigoberta Menchú*, which has been republished in honor of Menchú's 1992 Nobel Peace Prize, describes how she and her Guatemalan Quiché Indian community have reacted to ethnic and economic oppression. The *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation* investigates over 2,000 cases of human rights abuses during General Augusto Pinochet's rule between 1973 and 1990 and tries to explain how they occurred in order to teach future Chilean generations the value—and the fragility—of human rights. Americas Watch exposes the extent of United States support for the brutally repressive Salvadoran military in *El Salvador's Decade of Terror*, and in *Death Foretold* Martha Doggett zeroes in on the 1989 Jesuit murders, the attempted coverup, and the unsatisfying results of the trial of 9 soldiers accused of the crime.

The cruelty exhibited by human rights abusers is horrifying. Menchú's descriptions of the torture and

death of her father, mother, and brother at the hands of the government are shocking and painful. Equally emotional are the Americas Watch portrayals of the selective murders of political figures and the indiscriminate massacres of entire populations, and Doggett's harrowing tale of the killing of six Jesuits and two female coworkers at the Central American University. The Chilean report does not use emotional prose, but the seemingly endless lists of victims, their youth, and the analysis of the psychological damage caused their relatives, as well as the descriptions of detention centers and methods of torture, provoke a powerful response.

However, as all the authors are quick to point out, there is more to the issue than the thousands of victims; behind each violation are socioeconomic and political systems that allow such abuses to take place. Menchú is especially critical of the former. The *ladinos*, Spanish-speaking Guatemalans who control the country's repressive system, are the primary target of her criticism. Rich *ladinos* force peasants to work on their *fincas* (plantations) in wretched conditions and with little compensation. The government backs the landowners with "agrarian reforms" aimed at feudalizing the independent peasants. Even poor *ladinos*, whom she expects would be allies against economic injustice, say "Yes, we're poor but we're not Indians." Furthermore, Indians are not given the opportunity to learn Spanish, which often works to their detriment; Menchú recounts how she and her family had to hire sometimes untrustworthy lawyers and interpreters to handle their court cases and negotiations with the government—a great burden to their wallet and potentially their case.

Menchú's frustrations with the status quo led to her formal involvement with resistance groups, such as the Peasant Unity Committee (CUC), beginning in the early 1970s; since then she has gained international renown as a negotiator and activist. She writes that her skills are a compilation of physical and spiritual defense strategies developed over the years: "I just tried to turn my own experience into something which was common to a whole people." Menchú's resilience is grounded in intense cultural pride, religious faith, anger, and hope; her goal in confronting her society's inequities is to build "a real change inside people," to break down the fundamental prejudices that divide the oppressors and the oppressed.

The Chilean Commission has a similar goal for Chilean society: "[W]e need a new spiritual attitude. . . [Our] reflection and education [must] be aimed at bringing about understanding among all Chileans."

The report was conceived as President Patricio Aylwin Azocar's response to demands for reparation for the horrors suffered under Pinochet; over nine months in 1991 the commission gathered reams of evidence, including court and police records and the testimony of victims' relatives, witnesses, doctors, and (surprisingly) security personnel.

The report takes a unique tack in citing a general moral failing within Chilean culture as the reason a government so deadly to its citizens could come to be: "It is not our role to take a position on the moral responsibility that may fall to society as a whole as a result of its failure to react in a timely and vigorous fashion to what was happening. . . . Nevertheless we believe that what happened should lead all Chileans to reflect on the grave omission that was ours." Among the antidotes suggested is a thorough educational effort to create greater awareness of and appreciation for human rights. Although the well-written report is extremely valuable as a rare government self-examination, at times it tiptoes around the issue of the military's own separate ideology and culture and its paralyzing effects on Chilean society.

For Americas Watch, there is no question that the military ethos has been central to El Salvador's problems since 1980, and that the reform of the armed forces and accountability for human rights abuses by both the military and guerrilla forces must be carried out. A thorough examination of the perpetrators and victims (military groups, guerrillas, religious people, Communists) provides an enlightening look at the political dynamics at play. The United States receives prime attention for its aggressive cold war policy of eradicating communism where possible and backing "pro-democracy" forces at any cost.

One can question Americas Watch's assertion that the United States accepted the Salvadoran military's denials of human rights abuses at face value; but there can be no doubt that unequivocal American support of the Salvadoran government was presented to the public as essential to the cold war fight. After the massacre in El Mozote, for example, reporters from *The New York Times* and the *Washington Post* visited the site and recorded the story of a survivor. However, since no United States officials actually went to the site—United States officials were prohibited from entering guerrilla strongholds—the United States government claimed the massacre simply did not happen. Worse, government closed its ears to "unsubstantiated" reports of violence and kept the aid lines open by any means possible, even to the extent of misleading Congress and training some members of Salvadoran death squads.

Martha Doggett, writing on behalf of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, takes a closer look at one of the more famous Salvadoran tragedies, the 1989 Jesuit murders at the Central American University

campus. Doggett argues that the murders were not an instantaneous reaction to a guerrilla offensive, but a plot devised days earlier by high-ranking Salvadoran army officers. These officials later enlisted the army and the United States embassy in an extensive coverup that aided in the acquittal of 7 of the 9 accused of carrying out the crime and secured the anonymity of the plan's original backers. Like Americas Watch, Doggett presents a very pointed account of complicity and coverup; yet while her prose convincingly cries injustice, her partisanship must be considered in assessing her accusations.

These accounts, though from different perspectives, boil down to one emotion: fear. Fear is the primary weapon of military regimes. Fear of attack and reprisal silences the opposition. Fear of losing an ideological battle led the United States government to tacitly condone inhumane actions. The military governments in Guatemala, Chile, and El Salvador tried to obliterate all real and imagined enemies because they considered toleration of other political views a weakness that would destroy their physical and psychological power. For the civilians in those countries, overcoming fears and acting out against abuse required a staunch commitment to principles, a sacrifice of personal security, and actions that could potentially endanger family and loved ones.

Menchú exhibits this boldness, for which she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. A significant turning point for her occurred at the public execution of her severely tortured brother and other accused "subversives," an event intended to intimidate but which instead incited the civilian observers to arm themselves with weapons and rage: "Faced with its own cowardice, the army itself realized that the whole people were prepared to fight. . . . [T]he officer quickly gave the order for the squad to withdraw." She became aware that the military was vulnerable despite its vast shield of weapons and laws, and this fueled her determination.

The Guatemalan peasants' resistance to a regime based on fear appears to be the reaction the Chilean commission desires from the Chilean people. Is it right to expect, however—as the Chilean report seems to—immediate popular resistance to human rights abuses in a country that has been suddenly and brutally wrenched from its legal foundations and placed in a totally unfamiliar and dangerous situation complete with growing numbers of tortured and murdered dissenters? Established organizations, such as the Roman Catholic Church and human rights groups, had the advantages of an international network and public presence behind their response; yet until 1988, when nascent popular organizations appeared, the actions taken by the Chilean public are described as "inadequate." It takes time for a people abruptly isolated from their constitutional rights to find each

other and gain the confidence in themselves and their cause to abandon the security of a quieter and more passive life (though passivity is no guarantee of safety). Nor does everyone have the selflessness of Rigoberta Menchú, or the lifelong experience of resistance she had when such expertise became valuable. The fact that a significant number of people "at last" acted should be hailed as a battle won against fear and inexperience, not diminished as too little, almost too late:

The greatest value of these four works is that their publication breaks the silence that often surrounds repression. For example, following the publication of the Chilean report, many of the military men responsible for abuses were brought to trial and the government set up programs to compensate victims and their families. The knowledge that legal immunity is ultimately impossible may prevent governments from abusing human rights as a means to maintain power. The authors reviewed here exposed abuses long after they occurred, and did not always bring perpetrators to justice, but as long as they and authors like them continue to insist on unraveling extensive coverups and presenting the case of the oppressed, the threat of exposure, censure, and punishment is very real.

Melissa J. Sherman

Cuba in Transition: Options for U. S. Policy

By Gillian Gunn. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1993. 110 pp., \$9.95.

Wayne Smith, the former head of the United States interests section in Cuba between 1979 and 1982, once remarked that "Cuba has the same effect on American administrations that the full moon has on werewolves; they just lose their rationality at the mention of Castro or Cuba." How is it that an island of 11 million people exercises such power over the United States? Why is it that one year after the demise of the Soviet Union—Cuba's patron and the ostensible reason for America's belligerent stance toward the island—Congress passed the "Cuban Democracy Act of 1992," legislation that tightens the United States embargo of Cuba by prohibiting American subsidiaries outside the United States from trading with Cuba, and denying entry to ships that have docked in Cuba in the last six months? But most important: what can be done to make Cuba no longer a "four-letter word" in America's political vocabulary?

Gillian Gunn, the director of Georgetown University's Cuba Project, goes a long way toward offering a practical, level-headed answer to the last question. In *Cuba in Transition*, Gunn clearly assesses the roots of past policies and, in an especially interesting section, the political circumstances that have shaped the Clinton administration's ambivalent approach to the island (although ambivalence seems to be the policy guideline for almost all the administration's (in)actions).

Cuba, Gunn notes, "was disastrously damaged by the disintegration of the socialist world in the late 1980s" and now teeters on the brink of economic collapse. But the appearance of ox-drawn carts on the streets of Havana and daily eight-hour electrical "brownouts" throughout the country have not translated into widespread political opposition to Castro.

So what should the United States do? Gunn delineates three schools of thought in American policymaking circles: squeeze Castro, communicate with him, or normalize relations. The author coolly dispatches the arguments of the first school and instead advocates a policy of "squeeze-minus": a loosening of the grip on (and the rhetoric about) Cuba, to be followed by communication and then normalization. This path, Gunn argues, is the sanest and most pragmatic manner in which to nurture the germ of Cuban democracy at the grassroots level and the nascent free-market "islands" emerging in the Cuban economy. The result of the alternative policy, which could perhaps be termed "squeeze-ambivalence," is captured by Gunn in her conclusion: "As one particularly succinct Cuba expert in the Pentagon expressed it, 'Imagine the splatter effect of a Yugoslavia 90 miles from the United States.' Not an attractive image."

William W. Finan, Jr.

ALSO RECEIVED

The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself

By David Bushnell. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. 334 pp., \$42.00, cloth; \$17.00, paper.

The Disenchanted Island:

Puerto Rico and the United States in the Twentieth Century
By Ronald Fernandez. New York: Praeger, 1992. 288 pp., \$45.00.

Modern Caribbean Politics

Edited by Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. 332 pp., n.p.

The United States and Democracy in Chile

By Paul E. Sigmund. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. 254 pp., \$38.50, cloth; \$13.95, paper.

Cocoa and Cocaine: An Andean Perspective

Edited by Felipe E. Mac Gregor. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993. 168 pp., \$49.95.

The Organization of American States

2d ed. By O. Carlos Stoetzer. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993. 464 pp., \$65.00.

Brazil and the Challenge of Economic Reform

Edited by Werner Baer and Joseph S. Tulchin. Washington, D. C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993. 160 pp., \$13.95.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

JANUARY 1994

INTERNATIONAL

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Jan. 11—At a summit meeting in Brussels, NATO members vote unanimously to establish a plan for air strikes in the Bosnian war subject to specific conditions: the NATO air strikes must be requested by UN commanders in Bosnia and approved by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. NATO also announces plans to open the airport in Tuzla, 50 miles north of Sarajevo, for relief flights.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

Jan. 3—Haidar Abdelshafi, who headed the Palestinian delegation to the 1991 Madrid peace talks, delivers a petition signed by 118 Palestinian leaders to PLO chairman Yasir Arafat that criticizes his "autocratic" leadership and his representation of Palestinian interests in the negotiations leading up to the Israeli-PLO accord signed last September.

Jan. 7—The PLO signs an agreement with Jordan that will allow Jordanian banks to reopen branches in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; they were closed when the Israelis seized the territories during the Arab-Israeli War of 1967.

United Nations (UN)

(See also *Intl*, *NATO*; *Bosnia and Herzegovina*; *Somalia*; *US*)

Jan. 5—The UN names Lieutenant General Michael Rose of Britain to replace Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont of Belgium, who resigned as UN commander in Bosnia yesterday; Briquemont said he resigned for personal reasons.

Jan. 22—A new version of the 1983 International Tropical Timber Agreement, which expires March 31, is signed by 50 countries. The commodity pact goes beyond the original agreement in requiring industrialized countries to conserve their forests and provide conservation assistance to developing countries; in return, developing countries will drop their demands for a pact to protect all their timberlands.

AFGHANISTAN

(See also *Pakistan*)

Jan. 1—In Kabul, the capital, government troops for the 1st time clash with fighters loyal to General Abdul Rashid Doestam, whose defection from the Communist regime to rebel forces led to the government's fall in 1992.

Jan. 5—A 5th day of factional fighting in Kabul leaves approximately 80 people dead and some 2,500, most of them civilians, wounded; forces loyal to President Berhanuddin Rabbani regain control of the airport after battling with Doestam's militiamen.

ALGERIA

Jan. 13—Algerian newspapers report that the governor of the Tissemsilt region, Mohammed Bellal, and 18 other people were killed January 11 in an ambush by Muslim guerrillas in the northern part of the country.

Jan. 21—Western diplomats and human rights workers report that pro-government death squads, such as the Organization of Free Young Algerians, have been responsible for the murders of dozens of suspected Muslim militants over the past several months.

BELARUS

(See also *Russia*)

Jan. 26—The Communist-dominated parliament votes, 209 to 36, to dismiss Stanislav Shushkevich, a market reformer insistent on Belarussian sovereignty, as chairman of parliament and ceremonial head of state, charging him with corruption; Vyacheslav Kuznetsov, Shushkevich's conservative deputy, succeeds him. Conservative Prime Minister Vyacheslav Ke-bich also survives a vote for dismissal, 101 to 175.

"Belarus's new pro-Russian leadership," says Zenon Poznyak, leader of the Belarussian Popular Front, "will... bring the country into the Russian empire."

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

(See also *Intl*, *NATO*, *UN*; *US*)

Jan. 6—The death toll rises to 37 in the 6th straight day of heavy fighting in Sarajevo.

Jan. 8—Bosnian Serbs shell the Sarajevo airport, preventing President Alija Izetbegovic from leaving to meet with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. Hours earlier the Serbs had announced a unilateral cease-fire.

Jan. 11—Serb shells kill 6 people and wound 40 in Sarajevo; UN officials close the airport hours after it reopened to allow relief flights to land.

Jan. 13—UN officials confirm that the Bosnian army has taken over a substantial part of the last major Croat enclave in central Bosnia, capturing part of the highway between Vitez and Busovaca.

Jan. 21—Artillery fire kills 6 people and wounds 3 in a "safe" zone in Sarajevo near UN headquarters.

Jan. 26—UN officials report that Yugoslav army convoys have been entering Bosnia to aid Serb forces.

Jan. 27—Three gunmen abduct 3 British UN aid workers; 1 worker is killed and the other 2 are wounded.

Jan. 28—UN officials confirm that about 3,000 Croatian army troops have entered Bosnia.

Jan. 31—Bosnian Serb army officials announce a mobilization of "the entire able-bodied population" into military or labor units in order to conclude the Bosnian war. Serb forces currently occupy about two-thirds of Bosnia and one-third of Croatia; under the most recent peace plan proposed by the UN, the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats would each receive one-third of Bosnia.

BRAZIL

Jan. 21—A congressional committee investigating a multimillion-dollar congressional kickback scandal votes unanimously to charge 17 deputies and 1 senator with lack of decorum; they will be ineligible to hold public office for 10 years.

BURUNDI

Jan. 31—In Bujumbura, the capital, most workers stay home as gangs of young members of the minority Tutsi ethnic group barricade main roads and engage in looting and other violence; Secretary of State for Security Gakoryo Lazare says some deaths have been reported.

CHINA

(See also *France*)

Jan. 14—The government announces that it will free 2 Tibetan dissidents, Gendun Rinchen and Lobsang Yonten, who were arrested in May for theft of state secrets when they attempted to pass information on human rights violations to visitors from Europe; the 2 have not been tried.

COLOMBIA

Jan. 13—Colombian officials announce that they have arrested Carlos Demetrio Chávez, the alleged head of Peru's illegal-drug industry.

Jan. 16—Colombian guerrillas kidnap two US missionaries from a ranch southwest of Bogotá, apparently to protest US military aid to Colombia.

Jan. 23—In Apartadó, gunmen attack a block party organized by the leftist political party Hope, Peace, and Liberty; 35 people are killed. This massacre appears to be part of a rivalry between the guerrilla Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and Hope, Peace, and Liberty, which represents guerrillas who have rejected armed struggle.

CONGO

Jan. 31—*The New York Times* reports that in recent months, hundreds of people in the Shaba region have been killed in what aid workers say is government-sanctioned "ethnic cleansing."

CROATIA

(See also *Bosnia and Herzegovina*)

Jan. 19—Croatia and Serbia sign an agreement to establish diplomatic relations and set up offices in each other's capitals by February 15.

ERITREA

Jan. 1—State radio reports that President Isaias Afewerki has informed journalists of an attempted invasion of the country December 16 in which an Eritrean military commander and 20 Sudanese fighters were killed; according to the president there have been similar clashes along the border with Sudan as Islamic militants have tried to enter Eritrea to topple the country's secular government.

FRANCE

Jan. 4—France has agreed to deport to Iran 2 Iranians accused of the 1990 murder near Geneva of Kazem Rajavi, the brother of the leader of the People's Mujahedeen, today's *New York Times* reports; a French court approved the pair's extradition to Switzerland after their arrest in France. After France agreed last month to grant asylum to Maryam Rajavi, the wife of the group's leader, Massoud Rajavi, there were grenade attacks on the French embassy and Air France offices in Teheran.

Jan. 12—In a joint statement, France and China announce that relations have been completely normalized after a pledge by Prime Minister Edouard Balladur's conservative government not to authorize any new arms sales to Taiwan; French companies have effectively been excluded from competing for contracts in China since the previous, Socialist government approved the sale of 60 Mirage jets to Taiwan in 1992.

GEORGIA

Jan. 5—The death of former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who had been engaged in a failing insurgency against the government after his January 1992 ouster, is reported;

Gamsakhurdia's wife says he killed himself December 31 in a town in western Georgia that had been surrounded by government troops, and aides release the text of what they say is a suicide note calling the act a "protest"; the state news agency, however, reports Gamsakhurdia died today in Grozny, the capital of Russia's breakaway Chechen region and the base for his insurgency, after being wounded there December 31, possibly in a dispute with dissident aides.

HAITI

Jan. 15—Ousted Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide opens a 2-day conference in Miami with a speech calling for foreign governments to help restore him to power by February 7; no representatives of Haiti's military government attend the conference.

Jan. 28—Business leaders begin a 12-day strike to protest international sanctions against Haiti.

IRAN

(See also *France*)

Jan. 26—Bishop Haik Hovsepian Mehr, leader of the Assemblies of God churches in Iran, disappears after giving a speech in Teheran criticizing the persecution of Christians in the country.

IRELAND

Jan. 11—The government announces it is lifting its 20-year-old ban on radio or television appearances by spokesmen for Sinn Féin, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army and a legal political party in the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland; a similar ban in Britain stands.

ISRAEL

(See also *Syria*)

Jan. 1—Israeli troops shoot and wound 5 Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip.

Jan. 15—Terry Grace, a UN relief official, and 8 Palestinians are wounded by Israeli gunfire in Gaza.

Jan. 19—A Palestinian is killed by Israeli soldiers in Ramallah in the occupied West Bank.

Jan. 21—An Israeli farmer is stabbed to death in his orchard; 2 Palestinian suspects are detained.

Jan. 29—Three Israeli soldiers are wounded in a grenade attack in Gaza; the Palestinian Ahmad Abu Rish Brigade claims responsibility, saying the attack was in retaliation for the recent arrests of supporters of the Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

ITALY

Jan. 13—Keeping a pledge he made when he took office 8 months ago, Prime Minister Carlo Azeglio Ciampi resigns, paving the way for parliamentary elections 3 years ahead of schedule; many members of the current parliament and the 2 leading political parties have come under investigation in the 2-year-old "Bribe City" national corruption scandal; under Ciampi, major electoral reform legislation was approved for parliamentary races.

Jan. 16—President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro dissolves parliament and sets elections for March 27 and 28.

Jan. 19—The Christian Democratic party, which has dominated politics in the country since World War II, announces that it is changing its name to the Italian Popular party because of its association with the "Bribe City" scandal. Hours after the announcement, a large group of disaffected members calling itself the Christian Democratic Center breaks with the party.

JAPAN

Jan. 29—In an almost unanimous voice vote at a combined session of the 2 houses of parliament, legislators approve a compromise electoral reform package. Anticorruption measures in the new legislation include the redrawing of all 300 parliamentary districts in order to make them single-member districts in which rural voters are not so disproportionately represented; place a \$4,500 annual limit on corporate contributions to individual politicians; and establish public campaign financing. Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, who leads an 8-party coalition, had indicated he would resign if he failed to get electoral reform approved.

JORDAN

(See Intl, PLO; Lebanon)

KAZAKHSTAN

(See Uzbekistan)

KOREA, NORTH

Jan. 11—In an address to the Central Committee of the ruling Workers' party, President Kim Il Sung endorses a Chinese-style radical economic restructuring, with emphasis on exports, agriculture, and light industry. The coal industry will also be developed; coal is the only domestically produced energy source.

LEBANON

Jan. 29—Jordanian diplomat Naeb Imran Maaytah is assassinated in Beirut; no group takes responsibility.

LESOTHO

Jan. 25—Army troops mutinied January 23 in the capital city of Maseru after the government refused officers' demands for a 100% pay increase, *The New York Times* reports; South Africa has refused to grant Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle's request for military assistance to quell the mutiny.

MEXICO

- Jan. 1—In attacks that began this morning, guerrillas from the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) seize 4 towns in the southeastern state of Chiapas.; rebel leaders say they have resorted to guerrilla warfare to protest the government's treatment of the indigenous Lacandón Indians over land ownership and other issues.
- Jan. 4—Rebels withdraw from the captured town of Altamirano; fighting continues between the army and EZLN forces in San Cristóbal de las Casas and Ocosingo.
- Jan. 6—The government announces that the army has retaken the 4 towns from the guerrillas. At least 96 people have died in the fighting since January 1.
- Jan. 8—Four bombs explode in Mexico City, injuring 1 person and causing structural damage. The government says it believes the EZLN, which had threatened to extend its fighting to the north, is responsible.
- Jan. 10—President Carlos Salinas de Gortari removes Interior Minister and former governor of Chiapas Patrocinio González Garrido from office.
- Jan. 12—Salinas declares a cease-fire, orders the army not to attack retreating guerrillas, and offers amnesty to those who surrender.
- Jan. 25—The president meets with rebels in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, the capital of Chiapas.

NEPAL

Jan. 13—In Kathmandu, the country's 1st stock exchange opens.

NICARAGUA

Jan. 26—In Managua, the National Assembly meets for the first time in 16 months; rivalries between the leftist Sandinistas and the center-right governing coalition and legislative boycotts have kept the assembly closed.

PAKISTAN

Jan. 5—In Larkana, outside the home of Nusrat Bhutto, the mother of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and widow of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Nusrat Bhutto's supporters and national police clash after a disagreement between mother and daughter; 1 of the supporters is killed and 3 others and a police officer are wounded; in November Benazir Bhutto stripped Nusrat Bhutto of the chairmanship of the executive committee of the governing Pakistan People's party.

Jan. 20—After the arrival of an estimated 45,000 Afghan refugees fleeing factional fighting in Kabul, Pakistan has closed its border with Afghanistan, *The New York Times* reports.

PERU

(See Colombia)

PHILIPPINES

Jan. 30—The government signs a cease-fire agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front, a Muslim separatist group that has fought a 20-year-old guerrilla war in which 50,000 people have died.

RUSSIA

(See also Ukraine)

- Jan. 8—*The Economist* reports the final results from last month's elections for the State Duma, the lower house of the new parliament. In voting for the 225 single-member constituency seats and the 225 seats filled by party-preferential balloting, the reformist Russia's Choice coalition under 1st deputy prime minister Yegor Gaidar won 70 seats, the largest bloc, with 15.4% of votes cast. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic party received 22.8% of the total vote but won only 64 Duma seats, gaining 5 in single-constituency races. The Communist party captured a total of 48 seats, receiving 12.4% of the vote, while the allied Agrarian party won 33 seats, with 7.9% of the vote. Independent candidates won 129 single-constituency seats.
- Jan. 10—On the eve of the opening of the Federal Assembly, the bicameral parliament established by the constitution approved last month, President Boris Yeltsin issues a decree reorganizing the government; its measures include reduction of the number of ministries from 30 to 23 and of deputy prime ministers from 9 to 4.
- Jan. 14—The Duma votes to name as its speaker Ivan Rybkin, a leader of the Communist faction in the parliament Yeltsin dissolved in September. Yesterday the Federation Council, the upper house of the new parliament, elected 1st Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeiko as its chairman; the council has the power to send legislation back to the Duma, which can then pass the bills on its own with a two-thirds majority.
- Jan. 16—Economics Minister and 1st Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, the architect of Russia's economic reform program, announces he is resigning; Gaidar says he opposes recent decisions made without discussion in the cabinet,

including a planned monetary union of Russia and Belarus negotiated by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and disclosed to ministers January 4.

Jan. 19—The ruble falls 6.5% to a record low of 1,607 to the dollar.

Jan. 20—Chernomyrdin announces a new cabinet favoring more gradual economic reform and more government subsidies, declaring "the period of market romanticism is now over."

Jan. 26—Reformist Finance Minister Boris Fyodorov tenders his resignation to Yeltsin and subsequently releases a statement calling the reversal of official policy on the economy an "economic coup" by "Red... managers."

Valery Zorkin, the former chief of the Constitutional Court and Yeltsin opponent whose seat the president declared vacant in October, resumes work today on the court after a vote by the judges to reinstate him.

SOMALIA

Jan. 3—Employees of the UN Development Program and UN High Commissioner for Refugees are evacuated from Mogadishu, the capital, because of renewed Somali attacks on and threats against personnel of the UN military-humanitarian mission in the country.

Jan. 16—Under the leadership of elder Imam Mohammod Imam Omar, the 2 leading clans in Mogadishu sign a peace agreement after a 3-day conference in the capital. General Mohammed Farrah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, who control the country's 2 main militias, did not attend the conference.

Jan. 26—In the city of Belet Uen, 200 miles north of the capital, 50 armed Somalis loot 340 tons of food from the warehouse of the World Food Program, a relief agency.

Jan. 31—US marines kill at least 3 Somalis and wound 13 others on a busy street in Mogadishu; the US says the marines' convoy came under fire from snipers, but a UN officer stationed nearby and other witnesses dispute this.

SOUTH AFRICA

Jan. 9—In Katlehong township, southeast of Johannesburg, gunmen attack a group of leaders, including Cyril Ramaphosa, the secretary general of the African National Congress, and Communist party chairman Joe Slovo; a journalist is killed.

Jan. 16—The president of the militant Pan African National Congress, Clarence Makwetu, announces at a news conference in Johannesburg that the Azanian People's Liberation Army, the guerrilla arm of the organization, is suspending its "armed struggle"; the announcement clears the way for the group's participation in the elections.

SPAIN

Jan. 27—A 1-day strike called by unions brings industry to a halt and forces universities to close but has little effect in other sectors; the strikers are protesting proposed changes in labor law that would make it easier for employers to lay off workers.

SUDAN

(See Eritrea)

SYRIA

Jan. 16—After a meeting with US President Bill Clinton in Geneva, President Hafez al-Assad announces that Syria will resume peace negotiations with Israel.

UKRAINE

Jan. 14—In Moscow, Leonid Kravchuk, Boris Yeltsin, and Bill Clinton, the presidents of Ukraine, Russia, and the US, sign an agreement under which Ukraine will ship its entire nuclear arsenal of 176 long-range missiles and 1,800 warheads to Russia for deactivation; it is not clear whether the pact requires ratification by the Ukrainian parliament.

UNITED KINGDOM

Northern Ireland

(See US)

UNITED STATES

(See also Colombia; Somalia; Syria; Ukraine)

Jan. 14—The GTE corporation, the largest local telephone company in the US, announces it will cut 17,000 jobs over the next 3 years.

Jan. 18—Retired Admiral Bobby Ray Inman withdraws as President Bill Clinton's appointee for the post of secretary of defense; he cites press attacks on his character as the cause.

The final report on the Iran-contra scandal investigation is published; the report finds that former Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush were not guilty of criminal acts in their cover-up of weapons sales to Iran and use of the proceeds to arm anti-Communist guerrillas in Nicaragua.

Jan. 27—The Senate votes, 87 to 9, to request that the administration urge the UN to end its arms embargo against Sarajevo and to aid the Bosnian government if requested.

Jan. 28—The administration announces its new policy for US involvement in peacekeeping efforts. Washington will agree to support international peacekeeping operations financially or militarily only if it believes the situation is urgent, other countries agree to share the cost, and American troops remain largely under US command.

Jan. 30—The US gives Gerry Adams, the head of Sinn Féin, the political arm of the Irish Republican Army, a special 48-hour visa to attend a conference in New York.

UZBEKISTAN

Jan. 15—In Tashkent, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan agreed this week to create a common "economic space," *The Economist* reports; under the agreement, goods, services, and capital will circulate freely and the 2 countries will coordinate their economic policies until the year 2000.

YUGOSLAVIA

(See Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia)

ZAIRE

Jan. 14—In a nationally broadcast address, President Mobutu Sese Seko announces that he has dismissed the country's 2 rival governments and parliaments; both have been functioning since last year when Prime Minister Étienne Tshisekedi, dismissed by Mobutu, refused to leave his post, and a conclave appointed by the president named Faustin Birindwa prime minister. Mobutu calls on the 2 parliaments to jointly elect a new prime minister.

Jan. 19—Hundreds of thousands of workers in Kinshasa, the country's largest city, take part in a general strike called by Tshisekedi to protest Mobutu's actions; Tshisekedi rejects the president's proposal of January 14. ■



SPECIAL LIMITED TIME OFFER WHY NOT?

—take advantage of *Current History's* consistent excellence in covering the world by ordering a complete set of issues on the following countries and regions.

The Soviet Union

- ☐ (1980–84)
☐ (1985–91)

Africa

- ☐ (1985–91)

India and South Asia

- ☐ (1982, '86, '89, '92)

Southeast Asia

- ☐ (1980, '83, '84, '87, '90)

The Middle East

- ☐ (1980, '81, '84, '87)
☐ (1988–92)

South America

- ☐ (1986–89, '91)

Latin America

- ☐ (1980–82, '84, '90)

Europe

- ☐ West (1981, '82, '84, '86, '88, '90)
☐ East (1981, '82, '85, '87, '89, '90)

China

- ☐ (1980–84)
☐ (1985–91)

Canada

- ☐ (1980, '84, '88, '91)

Japan

- ☐ (1983, '85, '88, '91)

Mexico

- ☐ (1981, '83, '87)

Collected sets available for only \$19.75!

DISCOUNTS FOR BULK PURCHASE

Current History is now offering special discounts for orders of 10 or more copies of the same issue, and for 10 or more subscriptions mailed to the same address.

Available 1993–1994

- ☐ China (9/93)
☐ Russia and Eurasia (10/93)
☐ Europe and the Balkans (11/93)
☐ East Asia (12/93)
☐ 80th Anniversary Edition (1/94)
☐ The Middle East (2/94)
☐ Latin America (3/94)
☐ Central Asia (4/94)
☐ Africa (5/94)

Still Available

- ☐ Africa (5/93)
☐ New World Entropy (4/93)
☐ Latin America (3/93)
☐ The Middle East, 1993 (1/93)
☐ East Asia (12/92)
☐ Europe (11/92)
☐ The Second Russian Revolution? (10/92)

- ☐ China, 1992 (9/92)
☐ The United States (4/92)
☐ India & South Asia (3/92)
☐ Middle East, 1992 (1/92)
☐ Canada (12/91)
☐ The New Europe (11/91)
☐ Soviet Union, 1991 (10/91)
☐ China, 1991 (9/91)

NEW! *Current History* Audiocassette Series: Vol. 1, "The Disintegration of the Soviet Union"
Chart the course of the Soviet Union's demise with this 90-minute tape featuring condensed articles from *Current History's* esteemed coverage of the former Soviet giant—for only \$11.95!

Quantity Discount Price: 10 or more copies of the same issue, \$3.25 per copy—a savings of more than 30% (single-copy price, \$4.95). Copies more than five years old: \$6.00 per copy.

Quantity Subscription Price: 10 or more subscriptions mailed to the same address: \$24.75 per subscription.

☐ One-year subscription: US\$31.00

Name _____

☐ Two-year subscription: US\$61.00

Address _____

☐ Three-year subscription: US\$91.00

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

☐ Please send me the issues I have indicated above, in the quantities I have marked.

☐ *Current History* Binders: US\$9.95

☐ "The Disintegration of the Soviet Union" Audiocassette: US\$11.95

☐ Check enclosed ☐ Bill me.

For Visa or Mastercard orders, call toll free, 1-800-726-4464 (9 AM–5 PM EST)

Add US\$6.25 per year for foreign orders: \$7.25 for Canada (price includes GST).

All offers are good only on new orders mailed directly to the publisher. Bulk subscription prices are based on a single mailing address for all issues ordered.

***Current History* Binder:** A sturdy, hardcover binder will protect *Current History* for permanent reference. The easy-to-use binder holds a year of *Current History* securely in place over flexible steel rods.

CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, PA 19127 • 215-482-4464